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THE EVIDENCE RULES THAT CONVICT
THE INNOCENT
Jeffrey Bellin†
Over the past decades, DNA testing has uncovered hundreds of examples of the most important type of trial errors:
innocent defendants convicted of serious crimes like rape and
murder. The resulting Innocence Movement spurred reforms to
police practices, forensic science, and criminal procedure.
This Article explores the lessons of the Innocence Movement
for American evidence law.
Commentators often overlook the connection between the
growing body of research on convictions of the innocent and
the evidence rules. Of the commonly identified causes of false
convictions, only flawed forensic testimony has received sustained attention as a matter of evidence law. But other important contributors, like mistaken identifications and unreliable
confessions, also pass through evidence rules. These pathways to admission go unquestioned today but are the result of
long-forgotten policy choices that were once controversial precisely because they increase the likelihood of convicting the
innocent.
This Article highlights these, and other, overlooked implications of the Innocence Movement. It argues that the discovery and ongoing chronicle of hundreds of false convictions
present a unique opportunity to reevaluate American evidence
law. This reevaluation could lead to innocence-protective
changes to existing evidence rules and a welcome infusion of
energy into evidence policymaking and commentary.

† Professor, William & Mary Law School. Thanks to Ron Allen, Ed Cheng,
Brandon Garrett, Sandra Mayson, Fred Moss, Mark Spottswood, Maggie Wittlin,
and the participants in the Vanderbilt Summer Evidence Workshop, and the SMU
Law School Faculty Forum for comments on an early draft. Thanks also to Bethany Fogerty and Fred Dingledy for research assistance.
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“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of
truth . . . .”
—United States Supreme Court, 19661

INTRODUCTION
In 1923, Judge Learned Hand famously mused that since
the trial process provides the accused with “every advantage,”
the prospect of the “innocent man convicted” was “an unreal
dream.”2 Few observations have aged as badly. In the past two
decades, DNA tests definitively established the innocence of
hundreds of defendants convicted of serious crimes.3 These
revelations “changed the face of criminal justice.”4 No one
doubts any longer that the system convicts the innocent. The
fight has shifted to the size of the error rate.5
1

Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (“Our procedure
has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an
unreal dream.”); cf. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J. concurring) (questioning the prevalence of wrongful convictions).
3
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 6 (2011).
4
Id.
5
Compare Samuel R. Gross, What We Think, What We Know and What We
Think We Know About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 785 (2017)
(suggesting a false conviction rate for violent felonies “somewhere in the range
from one to several percent”), and Charles E. Loeffler, Jordan Hyatt & Greg Ridgeway, Measuring Self-Reported Wrongful Convictions Among Prisoners, 35 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 259, 259 (2019) (estimating a six percent wrongful conviction
rate), with Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom About the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60
ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 847 (2018) (positing a wrongful conviction rate of .016% to
.062%). See also Marvin Zalman, The Anti-Blackstonians, 48 SETON HALL L. REV.
2
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The discovery of large swaths of convictions of innocent
defendants energized reformers in a variety of areas. Indisputable examples of “false convictions”6 spurred reforms of police
practices, forensic science, and criminal procedure.7 Relatively
untouched, however, are the rules of evidence.8 The highly
influential Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence (Advisory Committee) has proposed few changes in response to the “Innocence Movement.”9 A smattering of state
laws respond to the revelations of the Innocence Movement in
ways that touch on evidence rules, but these changes serve
only to illustrate the absence of a more comprehensive reckoning for evidence policy.10
This Article explores the implications of the Innocence
Movement for the rules of evidence. It argues that the discovery and ongoing chronicle of hundreds of false convictions
1319, 1329 (2018) (“[J]ustice system professionals now accept the regular occurrence of a non-trivial number of wrongful convictions.”).
6
“Confictions,” a term of my own invention, broadly captures these cases,
which include, “wrong person” cases where “factually innocent persons . . . have
been convicted of crimes that they did not commit” and “cases where someone is
convicted for a crime . . . that never actually happened.” Cassell, supra note 5, at
818–19; cf. James R. Acker & Catherine L. Bonventre, Protecting the Innocent in
New York: Moving Beyond Changing Only Their Names, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1250
(2010) (noting that “innocent” in this context applies “to individuals charged with
crimes that either never occurred . . . or, more commonly, were committed by
someone else”). For a distinction between “false” and “wrongful” convictions, see
infra text accompanying note 70.
7
See Brandon L. Garrett, Actual Innocence and Wrongful Convictions, in 3
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 193, 193 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu/
sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4W8-9UXW] (“Judicial opinions, academic research, criminal procedure reform legislation, changed post-conviction
standards, new police practices focused on accuracy, new prosecution practices,
and changes to legal education have all flowed from this focus on innocence.”); see
also Lara A. Bazelon, The Long Goodbye: After the Innocence Movement, Does the
Attorney-Client Relationship Ever End?, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681,
700–01 (2016) (offering similar assessment).
8
Typical descriptions of the impact of the Innocence Movement omit reference to any changes to evidence rules. See supra text accompanying note 7.
9
The Advisory Committee convened a roundtable to discuss potential
changes to the rule concerning expert testimony but did not recommend any
changes. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE SPRING 2019 MEETING 14,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-rules-committees/agendabooks [https://perma.cc/Q3TZ-FK2K] (postponing consideration of amendment
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in October 2018 “that would prohibit an expert
from overstating conclusions”). In recent years, the Committee has made a number of minor changes, including a few that could be characterized as helping
defendants. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2019 amendment) (adding a corroboration requirement for certain statements against interest); infra note 42 (proposing
changes to notice requirements in Rule 404(b)). For a summary of the Innocence
Movement, see Zalman, supra note 5, at 1330–35.
10
See infra notes 137, 215.

R

R

R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN201.txt

308

unknown

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

Seq: 4

4-MAR-21

9:58

[Vol. 106:305

presents a unique opportunity to reevaluate evidence doctrine
and unearth insights, both new and forgotten. This new lens
brings out the importance of long neglected evidence rules and
offers a fresh critique of the theoretical grounding of American
evidence law.
***
The prosecution of an innocent person is the equivalent of
a stress test for the criminal justice system.11 The outcome of
such a proceeding should provide valuable data to evaluate the
system’s safeguards, including its evidence rules. Of course,
researchers cannot ethically conduct this type of test. But
America’s accumulation of a growing body of research on false
convictions provides a second-best alternative. A comprehensive categorization of the evidence used to convict factually
innocent defendants can function as a rough audit of the evidence rules. If the rules are intended to advance the search for
truth, false convictions shine a light on the rules most in need
of rethinking.
As this Article explains, the findings from the false conviction research offer fascinating insights for the rules of evidence.
The first thing that exoneration data suggest is that, contrary
to the cynics,12 the evidence rules still play an important and
direct (not just indirect) role in separating the guilty from the
innocent. It is widely recognized that approximately 95 percent
of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas,13 prompting
the Supreme Court to observe that plea bargaining “is the criminal justice system.”14 Reports from the Innocence Movement,
however, highlight one group of defendants that continues to
rely on trials: the factually innocent.15 The generalizability of
this observation is clouded by uncertainty, but the evidence we
have so far suggests that even as most defendants (including
some innocent defendants) plead guilty, the trial process continues to be invoked by a significant subset of the defendants it
11
“Stress tests” are used to assess whether a complex system will fail when it
encounters challenging conditions. See Christina Parajon Skinner, Misconduct
Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1598 (2016) (discussing use of “stress testing” of
financial institutions).
12
˘ , EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 129 (1997) (describing
See, e.g., MIRJAN DAMASKA
evidence rules, in light of the decline of the jury trial, as “more ornamental than
functional”).
13
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).
14
Id. at 144 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
15
See infra subpart II.A.
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was most intended to protect: defendants falsely accused of
serious crimes.16 The evidence rules governing those trials,
consequently, maintain a critically important role in a world
otherwise dominated by guilty pleas.17
The second thing we learn from the exoneration data is
that the evidence rules directly implicated in false convictions
are among the least talked about. The primary evidentiary contributors18 to false convictions are: (1) mistaken eyewitness
identifications; (2) flawed forensic expert testimony; (3) unreliable confessions; and (4) lying jailhouse informants.19 All four of
these types of evidence pass through a nonconstitutional evi16
See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J.
339, 352 (2012); infra subpart II.A.
17
Even if this were not the case, the evidence rules would still play an important, albeit indirect, role. See Nora V. Demleitner, More Than “Just” Evidence:
Reviewing Mirjan Damas̆ka’s Evidence Law Adrift, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 515, 525
(1999) (“On a practical level, settlements in civil cases and plea-bargaining in
criminal cases are not necessarily indicative of the irrelevance of evidence law
since evidentiary rules may determine whether a party will agree to a settlement
or a plea-bargain.”); infra subpart II.A.
18
I use the phrases “contributors to” or “correlates of,” rather than the more
common “causes of” false convictions. Wrongful conviction researchers have not
demonstrated that particular items of evidence “caused” false convictions. Instead, they show that certain types of evidence are frequently used, in conjunction
with other evidence, to obtain false convictions. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Still
Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1490 (2012) (reviewing BRANDON L.
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG
(2011)) (highlighting “the near impossibility of isolating and assessing the significance of any single factor in a given case”). As a result, it seems more accurate to
talk about evidentiary “correlates” or “contributors,” rather than “causes,” of false
convictions. This point should not be controversial, as it is widely acknowledged
that “cause” in this context is intended to be understood more broadly than
typical usage would suggest. See Gross, supra note 5, at 769 (“When we talk
about ‘causes’ of false conviction we usually mean facts in particular cases that
increase the probability that an innocent defendant will be convicted by providing
misleading evidence of guilt or concealing evidence of innocence.”).
19
See Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 727 (2013)
(identifying as leading contributors to wrongful convictions “eyewitness identifications, confessions, forensic science, and jailhouse informant or snitch testimony”); Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial
Sanctions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2928 (2009)
(“Based on numerous national and state-wide studies conducted since 1996, four
categories of admissible evidence have emerged as the leading causes of wrongful
convictions: (1) eyewitness identifications; (2) non-DNA forensic analysis of physical evidence; (3) testimony of jailhouse informants; and (4) confessions obtained
during custodial interrogations.” (footnotes omitted)); Fiona Leverick, Kathryn
Campbell & Isla Callander, Post-Conviction Review: Questions of Innocence, Independence, and Necessity, 47 STETSON L. REV. 45, 47 n.6 (2017) (“There is a remarkable consensus that the main evidential causes of wrongful conviction are
mistaken eyewitness identification, false confessions, misleading forensic evidence and the evidence of accomplices or informers (or others who have a motivation to lie).”).
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dence rule intended to ensure reliability. For one category, the
implicated rule is obvious. Expert testimony is admitted in
every jurisdiction through evidence rules (and legal doctrines)
that are heavily scrutinized by courts and scholars.20 But
apart from expert testimony, the evidence rules most implicated in false convictions—essentially hearsay exceptions—fly
so far under the radar that most commentators fail to notice
them at all.21 The absence of any modern controversy regarding the wisdom of these rules obscures a fascinating history.
These evidence rules are the result of long-forgotten policy
choices that were once controversial precisely because they
increase the likelihood of convicting the innocent.22
The cases that spur the Innocence Movement illustrate the
consequences of these long-forgotten evidence policy choices.
For example, commentators expressed disbelief that federal
and state courts rejected challenges to the admission of
Brendan Dassey’s confession, profiled in the television series,
Making a Murderer.23 As described by a dissenting judge:
20
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring judges to screen expert testimony to
ensure that it is “the product of reliable principles and methods” that have been
“reliably applied . . . to the facts of the case”); Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon,
Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA.
L. REV. 471, 503 (2005) (suggesting that “courts apply some generalized level of
scrutiny when considering the reliability of scientific evidence, regardless of the
governing standard.”); Brandon L. Garrett & M. Chris Fabricant, The Myth of the
Reliability Test, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1571 (2018) (critiquing state and federal courts for failing to rigorously assess reliability of expert testimony despite
Rule 702’s command).
21
See, e.g., Findley, supra note 19, at 754, 763 (“Alone among the prominent
contributors to wrongful convictions, the problematic nature of expert testimony
is explicitly addressed by the rules of evidence . . . . There are no rules that
uniquely address the unreliability of eyewitness identifications, snitch testimony,
or confessions.”). There is only sporadic discussion of this point in the literature. I
located only two examples that recognize the applicability of rules of evidence to
wrongful conviction correlates like confessions and eyewitness identifications. See
Richard A. Leo, Peter J. Neufeld, Steven A. Drizin & Andrew E. Taslitz, Promoting
Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability
Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 816 (2013);
Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 389 (2012).
22
See infra subpart II.B.
23
See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 317 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(summarizing state court proceedings and refusing relief on collateral attack);
Adam Liptak, Was It a False Confession in ‘Making a Murderer’? The Supreme
Court May Decide, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
06/11/us/politics/supreme-court-making-a-murderer.html [https://perma.cc/
9PE5-92LJ] (“[M]any people were made powerfully uneasy by the treatment of . . .
Brendan Dassey, whose videotaped interrogation was among the most gripping
parts of the series.”); Laura Nirider & Steven Drizin, False Confessions Drive the
True Crime TV Craze, But It’s Time To End the Spectacle, CHI. TRIBUNE (Aug. 9,
2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-true-
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Psychological coercion, questions to which the police furnished the answers, and ghoulish games of ‘20 Questions,’ in
which Brendan Dassey guessed over and over again before he
landed on the ‘correct’ story (i.e., the one the police wanted),
led to the ‘confession’ that furnished the only serious evidence supporting his murder conviction in the Wisconsin
courts.24

The outrage is understandable. While the evaluation of the
credibility of relevant evidence is typically left to the jury,25
there are good reasons to expect evidence law to exclude unreliable confessions like Dassey’s. An out-of-court confession
must pass through the hearsay rules, which ostensibly screen
for reliability.26 Indeed, American judges once demanded robust trustworthiness guarantees for hearsay confessions that
would have excluded precisely this type of evidence.27 But over
the past 150 years, courts and evidence rule drafters gradually
replaced the evidence rules that screened for reliability with
constitutional protections that focus only on process.28 Today,
these process-focused constitutional protections are all that
remain.29 Dassey’s confession was not admitted because it
was reliable. It was admitted because the sixteen-year-old was
read his rights.30
crime-television-false-confessions-20190809-ejtzggbu3rgkzj7fjazipye37ustory.html [https://perma.cc/7GFT-THAA] (“Dassey sits in a Wisconsin prison to
this day because a court held that the law does not clearly prohibit the tactics
used against him — even though viewers around the globe were outraged by what
they saw on his interrogation videotape.”).
24
Dassey, 877 F.3d at 319 (Wood, J. dissenting).
25
See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note, at 405
(“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it has been described as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary . . .’); Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98
MINN. L. REV. 7, 48 (2013) (“A witness’s credibility, however, is typically a jury
question . . . .”).
26
See ILL. R. EVID. 801(c), 802 (defining “hearsay” as “a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted” and prohibiting its admission
absent a specified exception); see also FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c), 802 (same); State v.
Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 807 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (“[T]he hearsay rules are at the
core of the judicial function: defining what is reliable evidence and establishing
judicial processes to test reliability.”); FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s
introductory note, at 405 (explaining traditional approach to hearsay as, “a general rule excluding hearsay but subject to numerous exceptions under circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness,” and adopting that
approach for “these [i.e., the federal] rules”); infra section II.B.2.
27
See infra section II.B.2.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Dassey, 877 F.3d at 306, 312 (emphasizing that Dassey “was given Miranda warnings and understood them sufficiently”); cf. Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 727 (1979) (rejecting challenge to confession where “the police took care
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Purported confessions to informants—another prominent
evidentiary contributor to false convictions—face even fewer
hurdles.31 For example, at Bruce Lisker’s trial for murdering
his mother, a jailhouse informant testified that Lisker confessed to the killing when they were both detained in Los Angeles County Jail. The informant claimed this happened, “during
their very first conversation,” through a hole in the wall between their pretrial detention cells, “before they even knew
each other’s names.”32 Again, this testimony communicated
an out-of-court statement to the jury to prove the matter asserted by the out-of-court speaker.33 Consequently, it had to
pass through the reliability-focused hearsay rules.34 But the
only surviving requirement for admission of this evidence in
California, and in jurisdictions across the country, is that the
statement relayed to the jury by the informant was (purportedly) uttered by the defendant and offered by the prosecution.35
As far as the modern evidence rules are concerned, there is no
question that this type of informant testimony is admissible;
and little controversy among evidence scholars, courts, or
policymakers over the (evidence) rules that ensure that result.
Not surprisingly, the informant’s testimony in Lisker’s case

to inform [the sixteen-year-old] respondent of his rights and to ensure that he
understood them”). Reading rights would be insufficient, of course, if the police
did not honor those rights and, for example, went on to employ physical coercion
to extract a statement. Fare, 442 U.S. at 727. But, again, the analysis would turn
on the process of extracting the confession, not its reliability. See id.
31
See infra section II.B.3.
32
Scott Glover & Matt Lait, From the Archives: New Light on a Distant Verdict,
L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2005, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-melisker22may22-story.html [https://perma.cc/DT4F-4G28].
33
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a)–(b) (West 2020) (defining hearsay as “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the
hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated,” and barring its
admission, absent an exception).
34
Id.; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 2020) (“Evidence of a statement is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an
action to which he is a party in either his individual or representative capacity,
regardless of whether the statement was made in his individual or representative
capacity.”). California’s Evidence Code also requires that the evidence be admissible under the State and federal constitution. CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1204. Some
jurisdictions require corroboration for informant testimony, but such regulation
is sporadic. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 177 (2009) (characterizing existing legislative restrictions
as “largely piecemeal” and proposing additional restrictions); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Prosecuting the Informant Culture, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2011)
(“[C]ompared to many other areas of the criminal justice system, snitching goes
largely unregulated.”).

R
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turned out to be false.36 But that discovery came much too
late. Lisker served twenty-six years in prison before the prosecution’s case fell apart, and the State dropped the charges.37
Out-of-court identifications—the most commonly cited
contributor to false convictions—are similarly admissible
under the evidence rules without any assessment of reliability.
For example, the Court of Appeals of Texas rejected Andrew
William Gossett’s (truthful) claim of mistaken identification by
highlighting police testimony that the victim “identified appellant as her assailant in the photographic line-up so fast that it
surprised the officer.”38 That evidence was hearsay,39 but its
admissibility was a foregone conclusion. Under the Texas
Rules of Evidence, like the Federal Rules, the only requirement
for admission of an out-of-court statement of identification is
that the declarant testify and is subject to cross-examination.40
These three examples illustrate one of the most remarkable
lessons policymakers can take from the research on false convictions. The evidence rules play as prominent a role in the
flawed convictions unearthed by the Innocence Movement as
any of the more widely-criticized levers of the criminal justice
system. And yet the implicated rules escape notice both in
debates about wrongful convictions and critiques of evidence
policy generally.
The third insight the false conviction data present is just as
striking as the first two: the evidence rules that modern commentators do single out for criticism do not seem to be implicated at all.41 The most famous, and famously reviled,
evidence rules—such as the highly contentious pathway for the
admission of prior crimes evidence,42 or the much-maligned
36
See Lisker v. Knowles, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Full
Coverage: The Case [sic] of Bruce Lisker, L.A. TIMES (March 20, 2015, 12:54 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/la-me-lisker-sg-storygallery.html [https://perma.cc/
AKH8-TEW3].
37
Full Coverage: The Case of Bruce Lisker, supra note 36.
38
Gossett v. State, No. 13-00-166-CR, 2001 WL 997400, at *3–4 (Tex. App.
Apr. 12, 2001).
39
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (defining hearsay as an out-of-court statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement); infra section
II.B.1.
40
TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(C); see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
41
See infra subpart II.C.
42
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The Advisory Committee recently proposed
changes to Rule 404(b)’s notice requirements. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES
OF EVIDENCE SPRING 2019 MEETING, supra note 9, at 24. The controversial rule
permitting impeachment with prior convictions, FED. R. EVID. 609, does appear to
play at least an indirect role in enabling false convictions. See infra section II.B.3.
The Advisory Committee rejected a modest reform to Rule 609 in 2018. See
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hearsay exceptions for “excited utterances,” “coconspirator
statements,” and “dying declarations”—are, so far, conspicuously absent from the false conviction narratives.43 The revelations of the Innocence Movement suggest that courts,
litigators, and scholars expend the bulk of their energy fighting
about the wrong rules.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I proposes a
methodology for using exoneration data to audit the evidence
rules. Part II analyzes the results. After highlighting the ongoing importance of trials in this context, the discussion focuses
on three areas: (1) now-uncontroversial evidence rules that
mechanically usher in the evidence used to convict the innocent; (2) largely-forgotten historical controversies regarding
these rules that bear revisiting in light of modern research into
the causes of false convictions; and (3) the stark contrast between the rarely-discussed rules that enable false convictions
and the evidence rules that draw lots of attention, but play little
role. Part III explores the implications of the preceding discussion. At this point, the goal of the discussion is not to argue for
specific rule changes. Rather, my aim is to propose a shift of
scholars’ and policymakers’ attention. If fostering the accuracy
of trial outcomes is the primary goal of the evidence rules, we
need to turn our collective attention to the rules that convict
the innocent.
I
TESTING THE EVIDENCE RULES
Any audit requires a clear methodology and a recognition
of underlying assumptions. This Part maps out these elements. It begins by proposing accuracy or, more precisely, the
ability to foster accurate verdicts, as the appropriate metric for
testing the evidence rules. It then describes the data we have
on false convictions and explores ways we can use this data to
test the evidence rules for accuracy.
A.

The Case for Accuracy

The modern law of evidence is one of the most intricate and
thoughtful endeavors in American jurisprudence. Expert bodies constituted at the federal and state levels draft carefully
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FALL 2018 MEETING 55–57 (Minutes of
the Committee Meeting of April 26–27, 2018) https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/2018-10-evidence-agenda-book_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/34QVHYVZ].
43
See infra subpart II.C.
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nuanced rules, typically with only moderate interference from
legislatures.44 Most law students take an “Evidence” course to
learn how those rules work, and the topic is tested on the Bar
Examinations required to practice law.45 Judicial opinions,
law review articles, and treatises carefully interpret the rules.
Out in the “real world,” trial courts consider evidentiary objections, and apply the rules to exclude or admit evidence, subject
to later appeal. Notably absent from this admirable enterprise,
however, is any effort to evaluate whether the evidence rules
work.
Even the question seems foreign. What would it mean for
an evidence rule to “work”? An answer requires an assessment
of the rule’s function. The primary end sought through the
evidence rules and accompanying trial process is factual accuracy.46 The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves announce a
“purpose” of “ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”47 The States largely copy this formulation;48 judges
and scholars echo it as well.49 Consequently, it seems fairly
44
See Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking”, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 846–56 (2002) (chronicling the creation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence). For a state example, see CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION PROPOSING AN EVIDENCE CODE 3–9 (1965), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/
Printed-Reports/Pub060.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEX6-EADR] (setting forth the
membership of the committees proposing the code and the comprehensive code
itself).
45
See Preparing for the MBE, MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION http://
www.ncbex.org/exams/mbe/preparing/ [https://perma.cc/3A5Z-KCM9] (last
visited Apr. 14, 2020) (listing “Evidence” as one of the seven subject areas tested
on the MBE); see also Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute,
and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 914, 915 (1994)
(“The evidence class plays a special role in bringing students into the
profession.”).
46
See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The
basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth . . . .”).
47
FED. R. EVID. 102 (Purpose).
48
See, e.g., OHIO EVID. R. 102 (“The purpose of these rules is to provide
procedures for the adjudication of causes to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”).
49
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law,
93 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2007) (“Scholars and policymakers thus overwhelmingly view evidentiary rules in criminal law as geared primarily toward accuracy in
fact-finding.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 590 (1996) (“[T]he
evidence rules have as their prime purpose the advancement of the accuracy of
the truth-determination process of our trials . . . .”); Dale A. Nance, Reliability and
the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 194 (2003) (“Evidence, or
the rules regulating evidence, may be said to be more or less veritistic, more or
less conducive to accurate verdicts.”); Michael S. Pardo, Evidence Theory and the
NAS Report on Forensic Science, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 367, 369, 372 (explaining that
theoretical accounts of evidence law “aim to either justify or to reform evidentiary
rules or practices in light of their tendencies to produce true (factually accurate)
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uncontroversial to suggest that the chief (although not sole)
purpose of the evidentiary project is to screen out evidence that
will distract or overwhelm the jury, and thus jeopardize the
likelihood of a factually accurate verdict.50 Apart from a few
rules that can best be understood as having been repurposed
to achieve discrete policy goals (for example, attorney-client
privilege),51 the evidence rules all seem to strive to this end.52
For better or for worse, we try through the rules to facilitate a
jury’s ability to reach the verdict that most closely parallels the
underlying facts.53 In the criminal context, then, the evidence
rules “work” when they help juries distinguish the factually
innocent from the factually guilty. Of course, the litigation process serves other goals as well. Fairness is important. And
appearances matter.54 But even if accuracy is not the only
goal, it is the one that matters most.
outcomes or produce false (factually erroneous) outcomes” and noting that these
accounts are “relatively uncontroversial”); infra note 53.
50
See supra text accompanying note 49.
51
See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373,
420 (1991) (“Most privilege rules are designed to sacrifice truth-seeking to other
values, and thus they are indifferent to the comparison of the conventional view of
the proof rules and the equally well specified cases proposal.”); Frederick Schauer,
On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165,
167–68 (2006) (“Privileges, for example, do not purport to serve epistemic
goals . . . . Such rules are the exception, however, and most of the exclusionary
rules are designed with the jury in mind and with the goal of increasing the
accuracy and efficiency of fact finding under circumstances of jury decision making.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 407 (policy-based rule banning introduction of subsequent remedial measures).
52
Some rules, like Rule 403 can be viewed as directed toward fairness, but
fairness, in this context, is explicitly conceptualized as a fair opportunity to point
the jury toward the factually accurate outcome. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory
committee’s note (“‘Unfair prejudice’ within its context means an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.”).
53
See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLGY 2 (2006) (“Judges and legal scholars have insisted repeatedly and emphatically that the most fundamental of these values is . . . finding out whether an
alleged crime actually occurred and, if so, who committed it.”); Ronald J. Allen &
Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87
NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1132 (1993) (describing process as an effort to “settl[e] upon
the most plausible account of what actually happened”). Scholars often criticize
evidence law’s deviation from truth seeking, but in doing so generally accept the
premise that the rules should focus on facilitating accuracy. See, e.g., Julia
Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 225 (2017) (“Until we
find a better way to look for liars, we should discard the practice and focus on
looking for lies.”); supra text accompanying note 49.
54
See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985) (“The aim of the
factfinding process is not to generate mathematically ‘probable’ verdicts, but
rather to generate acceptable ones; only an acceptable verdict will project the
underlying legal rule to society and affirm the rule’s behavioral norm.”).
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Over the years, it has been easy to overlook the need to
accuracy-test the rules of evidence because such testing
seemed impossible. One cannot discern by observing trials
and appeals whether the evidence rules work. This is because
we usually lack any ability, independent of the trial itself, to
assess whether verdicts are factually correct.55 Eleanor Swift
detailed this problem in 1987: “The goal of achieving accurate
outcomes should not be the sole basis for choosing evidence
rules since it cannot be ever determined which rules produce
accurate outcomes, or even reliable items of evidence.”56
Things have changed. We have long awaited an independent means of evaluating the factual accuracy of verdicts.
Post-conviction DNA testing provides that opportunity.
In fact, the false conviction data seems so well suited to a
reexamination of the evidence rules, that the absence of a more
robust discussion along these lines is surprising.57 When leading voices in this area offer observations like, “Few rules, however, regulate accuracy rather than procedures. Such matters
are typically committed to the discretion of the trial judge,”58
they overlook the field of Evidence. The evidence rules care a
great deal about accuracy. It is time to introduce those rules to
the Innocence Movement.59
B.

Using False Conviction Data to Audit the Evidence
Rules

The discovery of hundreds of false convictions provides a
means to audit the evidence rules for accuracy. Specifically, we
can use this data to identify the evidence pathways used to
55
“There is no general test for the accuracy of criminal convictions.” Samuel
R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 175 (2008).
56
Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
1339, 1361 (1987); see also id. at 1366–67 (“Truth, if viewed as the correspondence between outcomes and actual past events, cannot legitimate results.”). The
difficulty is exacerbated in cases where even DNA-type evidence cannot solve a
factual dispute, such as with an assessment of culpable recklessness. Cf. Allen,
supra note 51, at 393–94 (“Mental states are endemic to the western concept of
legal rights and obligations, and thus are central to litigation; and questions
concerning mental states are not well-formed in the sense meant above, nor do
they lend themselves to testing through replicable experiments.” (footnote
omitted)).
57
Cf. Findley, supra note 19, at 725 (“[N]ew understandings about wrongful
convictions warrant re-examining the constitutional and evidentiary rules that
have developed over time based upon assumptions about reliability and the effectiveness of those rules and trial processes.”).
58
GARRETT, supra note 3, at 8.
59
Cf. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 303 (1998) (“State and federal
rulemakers therefore have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish
rules excluding evidence.”).

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN201.txt

318

unknown

Seq: 14

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

4-MAR-21

9:58

[Vol. 106:305

convict the innocent. To the extent these pathways purport to
screen out unreliable evidence, they failed.60
The methodology suggested here is not perfect. For example, it only screens for one type of inaccuracy: false convictions.
It says little about another type of inaccuracy, “false acquittals.”61 In addition, the mechanism for DNA exonerations has
been sporadic and ad hoc.62 Shortcomings aside, it is also
important to emphasize the unique opportunity DNA exonerations offer to those who study law. In one respect, these exonerations are better than clinical experiments. DNA
exonerations are not just single-, double- or triple-blind. No
one knows when these “experiments” will occur. In most cases,
only after the jury reaches its verdict, and the appeals process
runs its course, do the lawyers and judges learn that the accused was factually innocent. Not only does this tragic phenomenon provide a way to review what went wrong, it may be a
singular moment in the history of criminal justice. The bulk of
false convictions came to light through challenges to verdicts
that predated the era of widespread DNA testing.63 Now that
DNA testing is widely available, we can expect fewer post-conviction DNA exonerations. Suspects can now be cleared by
DNA testing before trial. That is a good thing in every respect,
except one. It signals an end to our unintended stress testing
of the trial process. Whatever lessons are to be learned, we
need to learn them now.
On to the details. There is no official source of data on false
convictions. Instead, there are a few studies. Legal scholar
Brandon Garrett conducted one of the most-cited studies of
60
Cf. Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21, at 777 (“[C]riminal trials
overwhelmingly fail as a safeguard for protecting innocent false confessors from
the fate of wrongful conviction and incarceration.”). It is possible that evidence
rules “work” by allowing factually accurate information to be presented to the
jury, even in cases that result in false convictions. This Article need not wade into
that complexity, however, because of the dichotomous types of evidence called
into question by the false conviction research. When a defendant is later exonerated by DNA evidence, a positive eyewitness identification introduced at trial, as
well as any confession relayed by police or jailhouse informants, necessarily
pointed the jury to the factually inaccurate verdict.
61
See Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 65, 85 (2008) (“Reading the pertinent literature, one might think that wrongful acquittals never occur.”); Marvin Zalman & Matthew Larson, Elephants in the
Station House: Serial Crimes, Wrongful Convictions, and Expanding Wrongful Conviction Analysis to Include Police Investigation, 79 ALB. L. REV. 941, 943 n.10
(2015) (“A wrongful acquittal is as equally inaccurate as a false conviction.”).
62
See infra supbart II.A.
63
See Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, 48–49, 53, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION (Daniel S. Medwed ed. 2017).
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DNA exonerations for his 2011 book, Convicting the Innocent.64
Garrett updated this study in 2017, adding eighty DNA exonerations that occurred after 2011.65 By providing examples
where a guilty verdict directly clashes with the defendant’s factual innocence, Garrett’s collection of over 360 cases offers
valuable raw material with which to test the evidence rules for
accuracy.66
There is another, ongoing study of wrongful convictions
curated by University of Michigan Law School: The National
Registry of Exonerations (NRE). “The National Registry of Exonerations reports every known exoneration in the United
States since 1989, a total of 2,265 as of August 29, 2018.”67
The NRE is not limited to DNA exonerations.68 The criteria for
inclusion on the NRE is as follows:
“Exoneration” . . . means that a defendant who was convicted
of a crime was later relieved of all legal consequences of that
conviction through a decision by a prosecutor, a governor or
a court, after new evidence of his or her innocence was
discovered.69

As the above-quoted definition indicates, the NRE includes
some cases that may only represent “wrongful” (legally flawed)
as opposed to “false” (factually inaccurate) convictions.70 For
example, over 200 of the cases in the registry involve defendants who were convicted, but then received new trials and were
64

GARRETT, supra note 3.
Garrett, supra note 63, at 44. Garrett’s database can be accessed at the
following link: https://www.convictingtheinnocent.com/ [https://perma.cc/
49BB-F4MJ]. Garrett’s database of cases is drawn from the Cardozo Innocence
Project, which lists all collected wrongful conviction cases here: https://
www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/ [https://perma.cc/4ML9-P5F5].
66
See DNA Exoneration Database, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, https://
www.convictingtheinnocent.com/ [https://perma.cc/49BB-F4MJ] (last visited
Apr. 15, 2020).
67
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, MILESTONE: EXONERATED DEFENDANTS SPENT
20,000 YEARS IN PRISON 2 (2018), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE.20000.Years.Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7RN-2B3E]
68
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2018, at 5 (2019), http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations%20in%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3SQ-5QGW] (“Overall, DNA exonerations now account for 20% of the exonerations in the Registry through 2018
(484/2,372).”).
69
SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1989–2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 7 (2012), http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L26J-9BK8].
70
Cf. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 195 (2006) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(critiquing broad criteria for exoneration in Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby,
Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata Patil, Exonerations in the
United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 529 (2005)).
65
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acquitted.71 These defendants’ legal innocence is settled, but
their factual innocence remains at least arguable. At the same
time, the NRE presents a larger data sample and a broader
reflection of the American criminal justice system. DNA exonerations from the past decades typically occur in cases of sexual
violence and murder.72 The NRE includes those cases, but also
a wide variety of other cases, like drug crimes or robberies, that
do not typically involve DNA evidence.73
Both Garrett’s DNA exoneration studies and the NRE’s
broader collection of exonerations are valuable for our purposes. In particular, both endeavor to determine “what went
wrong”74 by identifying patterns in the cases that culminate in
convictions of the innocent. Those findings have been distilled
into a familiar, “canonical list” of the primary contributors to
later-overturned convictions.75 While there are distinctions between the NRE and Garrett’s data, both data sets agree on the
evidentiary contributors to false convictions that belong on that
list: “eyewitness misidentification, flawed scientific evidence,
informant testimony, [and] false confessions.”76
71
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS 3 (2015),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonerations.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6V4-538F].
72
See GARRETT, supra note 3, at 217–18.
73
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 71, at 3–4.
74
GARRETT, supra note 3.
75
CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 25 (Gerald Uelmen
& Chris Boscia eds., 2008), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=httpsredir=1&article=1000&context=ncippubs [https://
perma.cc/P9LH-R92Q] (“The most frequently identified causal factors include misidentification by eyewitnesses, false confessions, perjured testimony, mishandling of forensic evidence, withholding exculpatory evidence, and the
incompetence of defense lawyers.”); FLA. INNOCENCE COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 17 (2012), https://www.flcourts.org/content/
download/218230/1975326/Innocence-Report-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WR3Z-DDT5] (“During the two years of its existence, the Commission identified
five causes for wrongful convictions: Eyewitness identification, false confessions,
informants and jailhouse snitches, improper/invalid scientific evidence, and professional responsibility.”); Gross, supra note 55, at 186 (“There is a canonical list
of factors that lead to false convictions: eyewitness misidentification; false confession; misleading, false, or fraudulent forensic evidence; testimony by highly motivated police informants such as “jailhouse snitches”; perjury in general;
prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective legal defense.”); Laurin, supra note 18, at
1478 (recognizing the “key evidentiary pathologies that emerge from the dataset,”
include “eyewitness misidentification, flawed scientific evidence, informant testimony, false confessions, and weak defenses,” which “are consistent with the
‘canonical’ list of factors” that appear in the work “of every . . . scholar of wrongful
convictions”).
76
Laurin, supra note 18, at 1478 (recognizing that the “key evidentiary
pathologies that emerge from the dataset” include “eyewitness misidentification,
flawed scientific evidence, informant testimony, false confessions, and weak de-
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In sum, we have a valuable sample of cases to study. It is
not a random sample77 and we must be wary of drawing
broader lessons than are warranted. But the sample has much
going for it. It is a sample of case evidence policymakers should
care deeply about: innocent defendants convicted of serious
crimes. This may be an imperfect audit, but it is as good a tool
as we have ever possessed to try to determine whether the
evidence rules work.
II.
THE RESULTS
This Part reports the “results” of the American criminal
justice system’s unintentional stress test of the evidence rules
and explores their implications. It strives to use the exoneration data to assess how the evidence rules fared. As discussed
below, the results are instructive not only with respect to the
rules implicated in false convictions, but also for those that
appear to play little role. Perhaps most importantly, the discussion exhumes largely-forgotten policy choices that facilitate
false convictions. Modern courts, scholars and policymakers
troubled by the conviction of the innocent should be eager to
revisit these choices.
A.

The Evidence Rules Remain Important

The typical argument for the ongoing importance of evidence rules in a system dominated by pretrial settlement is
that the rules indirectly influence negotiated outcomes. Since
criminal defendants and prosecutors weigh the benefits of a
guilty plea against a trial alternative, the admissibility of evidence (and thus the evidence rules) plays an important role in
influencing the parties’ plea negotiations, even if few trials actually occur.78
The false conviction data supports a more direct argument
for the importance of evidence rules. Existing exoneration data
presents a particularly striking contrast between the typical
defendant and the factually innocent defendant. Innocent defendants appear to go to trial more frequently. Ninety-five perfenses,” which “are consistent with the ‘canonical’ list of factors” that appear in
the work “of every . . . scholar of wrongful convictions.”).
77
See infra subpart II.A.
78
See Demleitner, supra note 17 (“[S]ettlements in civil cases and plea-bargaining in criminal cases are not necessarily indicative of the irrelevance of evidence law since evidentiary rules may determine whether a party will agree to a
settlement or a plea-bargain.”).
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cent of convictions result from guilty pleas.79 In the data we
have so far, that number plummets to 17 percent of the convictions of those later exonerated (the NRE), and only 8 percent for
those later proven innocent by DNA testing.80
The statistical evidence regarding innocence and guilty
pleas is both critically important for modern criminal justice
debates and clouded with uncertainty. There are reasons to
credit the evidence and reasons to treat it warily.81 Let’s start
with the reasons for caution. Guilty plea rates vary by offense.
The types of crimes that typically lead to DNA exonerations
have lower guilty plea rates (rape, 83 percent and murder, 69
percent).82 Still, even adjusting for offense type, innocent defendants appear to go to trial far more frequently.83
Other reasons for caution include the ad hoc nature of the
exoneration process. It takes time, resources, and expertise to
overturn a conviction, and these commodities are finite. All
things being equal, we should expect advocates to focus on
defendants convicted after trial rather than those who plead
guilty. Defendants who plead guilty typically receive shorter
sentences than those convicted at trial.84 An already released
or soon to be released defendant will be a lower priority for

79
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas”).
80
GARRETT, supra note 3, at 150 (“6% of the exonerees (16 of 250) pleaded
guilty”); Garrett, supra note 63, at 44 (8 percent in 2017 update); Gross, supra
note 5, at 756 (“17% pled guilty, 67% were convicted at trial by juries and 7% were
convicted by judges”).
81
See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 180 (2014) (noting
that “factually innocent defendants may plead guilty because they are afraid that
they will be punished (often quite severely) for exercising their Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.”).
82
GARRETT, supra note 3, at 151.
83
The exoneration data overwhelmingly consider serious cases. It says little
about the likelihood of guilty pleas in minor cases where, for example, a detained
defendant can face a choice between a lengthy delay pending trial and a guilty
plea that results in immediate release. See, e.g., Laura Sullivan, Inmates Who
Can’t Make Bail Face Stark Options, NPR (Jan. 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725819 [https://
perma.cc/A466-HJYY] (describing intense pressures on defendants to obtain release through a plea bargain prior rather than wait for trial).
84
See Jeffrey Bellin, Attorney Competence in an Age of Plea Bargaining and
Econometrics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 153, 157 (2014) (analyzing empirical study of
murder defendants in Philadelphia and noting that for similarly situated cases,
“[d]efendants who are convicted after trial are typically convicted of more serious
charges . . . and receive lengthier sentences”).
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exoneration efforts.85 In addition, the act of pleading guilty
generates legal and rhetorical obstacles to subsequent claims
of innocence.86
While there are reasons to weigh the relative frequency of
reports of post-trial (as opposed to post-guilty-plea) exonerations warily, there are reasons to believe the imbalance reflects
an underlying truth.87 When accused of a serious crime, an
innocent defendant should be more reluctant to plead guilty, a
process that typically requires the defendant to formally admit
guilt while under oath in front of media, family, and victims.88
Innocent defendants should also possess inflated optimism
about the prospects for acquittal. The trial process is a test of
the prosecution’s evidence. A factually innocent defendant
should be more optimistic than a guilty defendant that the
prosecution’s evidence will fail.89
It is also important to note the extreme contrast presented
in the data. There is a substantial gap between the rates of
conviction by guilty plea (as opposed to trial) for all defendants
(95 percent), and the rate of conviction by guilty plea (as opposed to trial) for convicted defendants who are subsequently
cleared by DNA testing (8 percent).90 The raw numbers make
this imbalance even more striking. For example, in the federal
system in 2016, almost 64,000 defendants pled guilty to felony
charges while only about 1,500 were convicted after trial.91 In
Texas in that same year, 101,598 convictions resulted from a
85
A complicating factor that points in the other direction is that non-detained
defendants will be better able to assist in (or even direct) their exoneration than
those in custody.
86
Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in
open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”); see also infra note 88.
87
See Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 16.
88
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Central to the plea
and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant’s
admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment.”);
Scheele v. State, 953 So. 2d 782, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that a
plea colloquy “is a formal ceremony, under oath, memorializing a crossroads in
the case”). In some jurisdictions, defendants plead guilty without taking an oath.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (“[T]he defendant may be placed under oath, and the
court must address the defendant personally in open court.”).
89
Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 16, at 368 (pointing to psychological research
that supports the intuitive notion that innocent defendants would hold “systematically more optimistic beliefs than guilty defendants, which make trial prospects
seem more attractive to the former than they appear to the latter”).
90
See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 135, 143 (2012), 566 U.S. at 135, 143
(2012); Garrett, supra note 63, at 44.
91
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS, Federal Justice Statistics,
2015-2016, at 9 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs1516.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EU9M-S78B].
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guilty plea while 5,788 came after trial.92 Given this numerical
imbalance, the relatively infrequent appearance of guilty pleas
in the false conviction data looks all the more significant. In
sum, while the numbers we have may be misleading, as of now,
they point dramatically in a single direction.93
The prospect that an “innocence effect”94 substantially influences guilty plea rates is a perverse sliver of positive news in
the exoneration data. Garrett observes in his updated study:
“Not only do DNA exonerees disproportionately consist of individuals who had trials . . . but some DNA exonerees endured
multiple trials, after receiving reversals on appeal or post-conviction, before eventually being exonerated.”95 The prevalence
of trial convictions in the innocence data suggests that the
evidence rules matter, not only indirectly in shaping plea bargains and settlements, but directly as well. Despite the welldocumented pressures and distortions in our system,96 it appears from the data we have so far that a significant portion of
innocent defendants accused of serious offenses go to trial. We
need to look closely at why, in such circumstances, the rules
fail.
B.

Evidence Rules that Fail the Innocent

The evidence rules have so far survived the Innocence
Movement largely unscathed.97 Yet all four of the primary evidentiary contributors to false convictions traverse these
92
OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., STATE OF TEX. JUDICIAL BRANCH, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY, at Detail 10 (2016), https://www.txcourts.gov/
media/1436989/annual-statistical-report-for-the-texas-judiciary-fy-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HX2B-WURL].
93
Investigating this important question, Oren Gazal-Ayal and Avishalom Tor
scoured a “diverse body of evidence,” including post-conviction interviews, exoneration data, and controlled experiments. Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 16, at
347. They conclude that there is a strong “innocence effect.” Id. Looking at
similar data, others, like Russell Covey, suggest that the effect is largely an artifact of selection effects. See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of
Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1164 (2013) (“[T]he fact that so
many mass exoneration cases were resolved by guilty pleas should erode any
perception that actually innocent defendants almost uniformly refused to plead
guilty.”); Garrett, supra note 3, at 152–53 (“Just because few of these exonerees
pleaded guilty does not mean that wrongful convictions are less of a problem for
people who plead guilty . . . .”).
94
Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 16, at 339.
95
Garrett, supra note 63, at 44.
96
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2467 (2004) (highlighting the “many structural impediments
that distort bargaining in various cases”).
97
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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rules.98 The rule covering expert testimony is regularly recognized in this context.99 This subpart highlights the typically
unnoticed rules applicable to the other three evidentiary contributors to false conviction. These rules are uncontroversial
today. Yet as the following discussion shows, they arose out of
eerily prescient historical debates centered on the danger of
convicting the innocent.
1.

Eyewitness Identifications

Those who attempt to draw lessons from the exoneration
data frequently highlight eyewitness identification errors.100
Garrett’s most recent study finds that 72 percent of convictions
of innocent defendants involved mistaken eyewitness identifications.101 Importantly, there are two potential moments when
the prosecution presents a witness identification to the
factfinder. One occurs during the trial itself when the prosecutor asks the witness to point out the perpetrator in court.
It has long been recognized, however, that in-court identifications are “unsatisfactory and inconclusive.”102 Given the defendant’s prominent place on the courtroom stage,103 a
witness’ selection of the person sitting where the defendant sits
during trial is pro forma.104 John Henry Wigmore articulated
the long-standing received wisdom as follows:
Ordinarily, when a witness is asked to identify the assailant,
or thief, or other person who is the subject of his testimony,
the witness’ act of pointing out the accused (or other person),
then and there, is of little testimonial force. After all that has
98
For a discussion of those correlates and how they are identified, see infra
subpart I.B. For a discussion of the use of the term “correlates” as opposed to
“causes,” see supra note 18.
99
See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Foreword: Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459, 1459–61 (2018) (discussing 2017 symposium conducted by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules to consider changes to Rule 702).
100
See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78
(2008) (“The overwhelming number of convictions of the innocent involved eyewitness identification—158 of 200 cases (79%).”).
101
Garrett, supra note 63, at 46.
102
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note.
103
Cf. Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom,
92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2008) (“While a defendant sits in court . . . he is at
center stage and on display for the jury.”).
104
30B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JEFFREY BELLIN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 6762 (2020) [hereinafter WRIGHT & BELLIN] (“The testifying witness should be
expected to pick the defendant out in most courtroom settings even if unable to
make an identification in less suggestive circumstances.”).
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intervened, it would seldom happen that the witness would
not have come to believe in that person’s identity.105

As a result of the superficial nature of an in-court identification, prosecutors have long sought to introduce more compelling identification evidence in the form of the witness’ prelitigation identification of the defendant, typically in some kind
of lineup.106
Testimony about prior identifications can take two forms:
(1) the witness describes the prior identification procedure and
its outcome; or (2) a police officer who participated in the earlier
procedure testifies about what transpired.107 The prosecution
may present both forms of the evidence to maximize its impact.108 Either way, the factfinder learns about an out-of-court
statement: the witness stating on an earlier occasion, “That is
the person who robbed me.”109 Since the prosecutor introduces the statement as proof of that fact, it is hearsay.110
Across the country, prior statements of identification are
admissible despite the hearsay prohibition.111 States typically
105
2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT
COMMON LAW § 1130 (1904) (emphasis omitted).
106
Cf. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967) (“[T]he witness’ testimony of his lineup identification will enhance the impact of his in-court identification on the jury. . . .”).
107
See WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6763 (“[C]ourts commonly allow
another person to testify about an eyewitness’s out-of-court identification, so long
as the eyewitness also testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination
about the identification.”).
108
Id.
109
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note (“[I]t falls beyond a
doubt in the category of prior out-of-court statements.”).
110
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (defining “hearsay” as a statement made
outside the current hearing, offered to prove the “truth of the matter asserted” by
the out-of-court speaker); FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s note (“Some
nonverbal conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a suspect in a lineup, is
clearly the equivalent of words, assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a
statement.”); Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272 n.3 (“The recent trend . . . is to admit the
prior identification under the exception that admits as substantive evidence a
prior communication by a witness who is available for cross-examination at
trial.”); Murphy v. State, 51 S.W. 940, 943 (Tex. Crim App. 1899) (excluding
evidence of prior identification on grounds that “[t]his was hearsay and
inadmissible.”).
111
BARBARA E. BERGMAN, NANCY HOLLANDER & THERESA M. DUNCAN, 2 WHARTON’S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 6:13 (15th ed. 2019) (“Most states follow the federal rule.”).
Some rules, like the federal rules, declare this evidence “not hearsay” (despite the
fact that it meets the hearsay definition) while others style it an exception. See
FED R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C); see also discussion infra note 143. I use “exception” in
the text because, analytically, the admission of the evidence is an exception to the
general prohibition of hearsay. But nothing turns on the word choice. Nebraska
used to have no hearsay exception for prior identifications, see State v. Wilson,
754 N.W.2d 780, 788 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (highlighting absence), but amended its
code in 2019 to include a provision that mirrors the federal rule. See Legis. B.
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adopt the formulation in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C),
defining as “not hearsay” an otherwise hearsay statement that
“identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier,” so long as the declarant testifies.112 There is little modern
controversy over this rule.113 The Reporter for the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence recently summarized the consensus: “the existing Rule 801(d)(1)(C) is working
well and should be retained.”114
The rationale for the admission of out-of-court statements
of identification tracks its value as compelling prosecution evidence. As the Ninth Circuit explains: “The reasons for admitting identification statements as substantive evidence are that
out-of-court identifications are believed to be more reliable
than those made under the suggestive conditions prevailing at
trial . . . .”115 The Advisory Committee’s Note to the hearsay
exception similarly touts the relative superiority of out-of-court
identifications, and emphasizes that the exception “finds substantial support” in the pre-rules case law.116
Other than its potential to convict the innocent, then, all
seems well with the hearsay exception for prior identifications.
This wasn’t always the case. After the Advisory Committee
proposed the rule with the original Federal Rules of Evidence in
1971, Congress killed it.117 Senator Sam Ervin, famous for his
role in the Watergate hearings,118 spearheaded the
opposition.119
392, 106th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2019). For legislative materials on the change,
see Neb. Legislature, LB392 - Change Hearsay Provisions in the Nebraska Evidence Rules, https://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=
37735 [https://perma.cc/HCY3-UC8V] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
112
See FED R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
113
“In practice, Rule 801(d)(1)(C) has proved relatively uncontroversial.”
Daniel J. Capra, Prior Statements of Testifying Witnesses: Drafting Choices to
Eliminate or Loosen the Strictures of the Hearsay Rule, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429,
1445 (2016).
114
Id. at 1446.
115
United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1981).
116
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note. See also David E.
Seidelson, Third-Party Testimony About Prior Identifications and Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(C): A Petition for Rehearing, 8 REV. LITIG. 259, 260–61 (1989)
(“Yet, almost all extrajudicial declarations offered to prove the truth of the matters
asserted therein are made closer in time to the operative facts. Nevertheless, the
hearsay rule generally excludes such declarations.”)
117
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: TEXT AND
HISTORY xii, 331–33 (2015).
118
See KARL E. CAMPBELL, SENATOR SAM ERVIN, LAST OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 4
(2007).
119
See FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 117, at 331.
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While proponents of the prior identification exception later
dismissed Congress’ resistance as a product of confusion about
the distinction between weight and admissibility,120 Ervin’s opposition should not be lightly discounted. Ervin had been a
trial lawyer, trial court judge, and highly-respected Justice of
the North Carolina Supreme Court.121 He prided himself on
being “one of the few lawyers of his generation” who had read
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England
cover to cover.122 Ervin’s judicial opinions reflect careful attention to the law.123 One of his most notable opinions draws on
Wigmore’s canonical evidence treatise to reverse a death sentence, in part, because of the questionable nature of the prosecution’s identification evidence.124 Perhaps the most telling
data point is that North Carolina evidence law, in Ervin’s time
and to this day, does not include a hearsay exception for prior
statements of identification.125 Thus, there is no reason to
think Ervin’s opposition was not well considered. It was also
vehement. Congressman William Hungate later reported that
Ervin’s opposition to the prior identification exception was so
fierce that it jeopardized the entirety of the evidence rules project.126 Unfortunately, the only memorialization of the opposition appears in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report that
killed the proposal, which expresses a cursory “concern that a
person could be convicted solely upon evidence admissible
under [the proposed rule].”127
Ervin retired shortly after Congress passed the legislation
that enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, without the proposed hearsay exception for prior identifications.128 After his
retirement, Ervin’s opponents promptly reintroduced the ex120
PHILIP A. HART, AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. NO.
94-199, at 2 (1975) (describing prior objection as “misdirected” because, in part,
the hearsay “exception is addressed to the ‘admissibility’ of evidence and not the
‘sufficiency’ of evidence”).
121
See CAMPBELL, supra note 118, at 43, 69, 77.
122
Id. at 49.
123
Id.
124
State v. Palmer, 52 S.E.2d. 908, 914 (N.C. 1949) (citing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 415, (3d ed.)).
125
See State v. Patterson, 420 S.E.2d 98, 102 (N.C. 1992) (noting distinction
between federal and North Carolina law).
126
121 CONG. REC. 31,866 (reporting colloquy in House that a Senator had
communicated that “if we did not accept this [stripping out the provision], we
would not get the bill”); Capra, supra note 113, at 1445 (“[T]he House acquiesced
to that rejection in order to ensure passage of the Rules of Evidence.”).
127
WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6761 (referencing S. Rep. No. 194
(1975)).
128
Campbell, supra note 118, at 296–97; FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 117,
at 333.
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ception and rushed it through Congress.129 (The Senate Report
justifying reintroduction of the exception frames the renewed
interest as arising “[u]pon reflection.”)130 The effort succeeded.
With Ervin out of the picture, Congress reversed course and
approved the prior identification exception, which went into
effect a mere three months after the Federal Rules of
Evidence.131
The Senate Report on the resurrected prior identification
exception acknowledged worries about the type of evidence the
rule could permit, emphasizing an intent to allow only: “nonsuggestive lineup, photographic and other identifications,
made in compliance with the Constitution.”132 Despite these
assurances, however, the prior identification hearsay exception
does not itself screen for reliability—something that would
have represented a ready compromise between Ervin’s position
and that of his opponents. Instead, the rule leaves “compliance
with the Constitution” as the sole safeguard.133 But the Supreme Court has held that constitutional due process constraints apply only in a narrow circumstance: when state
actors manipulate the identification procedure to create “a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”134 As
explained in the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement
on the topic:
In our system of justice, fair trial for persons charged with
criminal offenses is secured by the Sixth Amendment, which
guarantees to defendants the right to counsel, compulsory
process to obtain defense witnesses, and the opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution. Those safeguards apart, admission of evidence in state trials is ordinarily governed by state law, and the reliability of relevant

129

FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 117, at 333.
S. Rep. No. 94-199, at 2.
131
FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 117, at 333.
132
S. Rep. No. 94-199, at 1, 3 (noting as well that evidence “still must meet
constitutional muster” (emphasis omitted)); H.R. Rep. 94-355, at 2 (1975) (“[T]he
out-of-court statement of identification must still meet constitutional standards”);
see also WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6761 n.1 (“Congress stripped the
proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(C) out of the rules submitted to it by the Supreme Court.
Congress then promptly added the rule back in shortly after it enacted the original
Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
133
S. Rep. No. 94-199, at 1.
134
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232 (2012) (quoting Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)); see also id. at 241 (“The due process
check for reliability, . . . comes into play only after the defendant establishes
improper police conduct.”).
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testimony typically falls within the province of the jury to
determine.135

Another portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion expressly
leaves reliability screening of eyewitness identifications to the
“protective rules of evidence.”136 With the Supreme Court and
the rules of evidence deferring to each other on the question of
reliability, most jurisdictions end up with no effective reliability
screen for out-of-court hearsay identifications.137 The opponent of the evidence receives only the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant-eyewitness—a witness who may adamantly believe in the truthfulness of the prior identification
even when mistaken.138
2.

Confessions to Law Enforcement

Researchers highlight false confessions to police as a substantial contributor to false convictions.139 In his updated
study of DNA exonerations, Garrett finds that 21 percent of the
convictions of innocent defendants involved false confessions.140 The NRE’s most recent report states that a false confession appeared in 13 percent of convictions that led to
exonerations, including 21 percent of homicides.141
A prosecutor can most easily lay the foundation for admitting a defendant’s confession through the testimony of the po135

Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 233, 245.
137
My research assistant, Bethany Fogerty, and I reviewed the state analogues and found that most states have rules that are substantially identical to
the federal variant. Table on file with author. A few states (e.g., Connecticut,
Minnesota and New Jersey) include additional limits on the admissibility of prior
statements of identification. See, e.g., CONN. CODE EVID. 8-5 (“The identification of
a person made by a declarant prior to trial where the identification is reliable.”);
see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d. 872, 919–21 (N.J. 2011) (creating more
rigorous screening under state constitution); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673,
694–95 (Or. 2012) (attempting to construct more rigorous screen of eyewitness
identification evidence from rules of evidence); supra note 111 (noting the change
in Nebraska identification laws).
138
See Gary L. Wells, R. C. L. Lindsay & Tamara J. Ferguson, Accuracy,
Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 440, 447 (1979) (explaining phenomenon); infra subpart II.C.
139
Garrett, supra note 100, at 88–89 (“In thirty-one cases (16%), a false confession was introduced at trial. . . . The confessions were particularly powerful at
trial, perhaps in part because in some cases law enforcement supplied false facts
to bolster false confessions.”).
140
Garrett, supra note 63, at 46.
141
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 71, at 11. The NRE’s 2018
report collects nineteen new cases involving false confessions out of a total of 151
new exonerations, or 12.5 percent. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note
68, at 2.
136
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lice officer who interrogated the defendant.142 The officer tells
the jury about the defendant’s incriminating statements, or
explains the origins of a recording or document memorializing
the defendant’s words. The officer’s testimony introduces the
defendant’s out-of-court statement (“I committed the robbery”)
as proof of the matter asserted in that statement. That’s
hearsay.143
Following the model of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2),
American jurisdictions reflexively admit confessions, despite
the hearsay prohibition, as “an opposing party’s statement.”144
These confessions constitute powerful evidence: “the trial
equivalent of a deadly weapon.”145 Nevertheless, the Advisory
Committee emphasizes that “[n]o guarantee of trustworthiness
is required.”146 The underlying rationale for admissibility is a
sense of fair play. “Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their
admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system
rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay
rule.”147
Courts and litigants spend little energy pondering the admissibility of criminal defendants’ statements under the evidence rules. Modern evidence doctrine offers almost nothing to
ponder. “The only question is did the statements come from
the party’s mouth, pen, keyboard, etc. If the answer is yes, and
the statements are offered by the opposing party, the statements qualify for admission . . . .”148 Litigants still fight over
the admissibility of confessions, of course, but courts funnel
142
See Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21, (“When the prosecution
seeks to introduce into evidence a defendant’s confession, invariably it relies upon
the state’s evidentiary rules regarding admissions of a party opponent.”).
143
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c) (defining hearsay). Through “definitional
sleight of hand,” the Federal Rules of Evidence redefine such statements, when
offered by an opposing party, as “not hearsay.” WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104,
§ 6731. These semantic contortions are required because the statements are, in
fact, hearsay under the definition of the term. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c); cf.
Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90 (1954) (“Admissions, retold at a trial, are
much like hearsay, that is, statements not made at the pending trial.”); Leo,
Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21 (“When the prosecution seeks to introduce into evidence a defendant’s confession, invariably it relies upon the state’s
evidentiary rules regarding admissions of a party opponent.”).
144
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
145
United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
146
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note; Jewell v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 135 F.3d 361, 365 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Trustworthiness is not a separate requirement for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).”).
147
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.
148
WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6773.
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these fights through Fifth Amendment criminal procedure
doctrine.149
To justify the ready conduit for admission of an opposing
party’s hearsay statements, the Advisory Committee that
drafted the federal rules pointed to common law cases doing so,
and “the apparently prevalent satisfaction with the results.”150
Oddly, the Committee cites Wigmore as authority on this
point.151 Wigmore, it is true, stated the general rule in simple
terms: “Any utterance made by a party . . . asserting any relevant fact, in express words or by implication, and offered
against the party, is termed an Admission, and is receivable as
a piece of evidence.”152 But the Advisory Committee’s citation
is misplaced. Wigmore followed the general rule with a series of
limitations on a distinct subset of party-opponent statements,
“confessions,”153 a topic to which he devoted fifty-two sections
of his canonical evidence treatise.154 The topic resonated beyond the legal academy. The Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court wrote in 1881: “There is no branch of the law of
evidence in such inextricable confusion as that relative to
confessions.”155
The Missouri Chief Justice was alluding to a prominent
vein of the common law of evidence that required judges to
screen confessions for reliability. Courts closely scrutinized
this “doubtful species of evidence” which “at all times ought to
149

See infra note 178.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C) advisory committee’s note.
151
Id. The Advisory Committee also cites Edmund Morgan, who similarly
carves out confessions as a distinct question. See EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 284 (1962). The other writer cited by the Advisory Committee does not discuss the “confessions” debate and seems focused on the civil
context. See John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 484, 579 (1937).
152
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
LAW 201, Rule 128 (3d ed. 1942).
153
Id. at 203, Rule 130(a) (“The confession of the accused in a criminal case is
admissible only on the conditions named in Rule 135 . . . .” (emphasis omitted));
id. at 217–22, Rule 135 (listing series of limitations designed to ensure reliability
when a confession was “not made in open Court”).
154
1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT
COMMON LAW §§ 815–867 (1904); WIGMORE, supra note 105, §§ 815–867, § 1050
(defining confessions as “a direct assertion, by the accused in a criminal case, of
the main fact charged against him or of some fact essential to the charge”); see
also WIGMORE, supra, § 815 (“The situation of a person charged with crime is
obviously peculiar with reference both to the circumstances under which these
advantages will be presented, as well as to their nature and force; and thus, in
history and in principle, statements in the nature of confessions of guilt by an
accused person stand somewhat apart and call for a separate treatment in the law
of evidence.”).
155
State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695, 705 (1881).
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be received with great caution.”156 Importantly, this restriction
did not arise from the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Enforcement of the constitutional privilege
sought to deter abusive government practices, protecting the
guilty (whose confessions were true) as much as the innocent
(whose confessions were false).157 Evidence law’s hearsay-confession doctrine, by contrast, was a common law rule of evidence directed exclusively toward “exclud[ing] self-criminating
statements which are false.”158 Vexed by the mounting confusion at the turn of the century, Wigmore dedicated a section of
his treatise to clarifying that under the evidence rule, “a confession is not rejected because of any connection with the privilege
against self-crimination.”159
Wigmore himself despised the common law’s resistance to
confessions, calling it “an exhibition of sentimentalism toward
criminals.”160 He rationalized the rule, arising “during the latter half of the 1700s and the first part of the 1800s,” as “a
natural reaction from the harshness and unjust severity prevailing in penal administration up to that time.”161 Reminiscent of Judge Hand’s skepticism about “the ghost of the
156
State v. Bostick, 4 Del. 563, 564 (Del. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1845) (“But it
has been said by some eminent jurists, that, as verbal confessions are so often
misunderstood or misrepresented, from a want of attention, the improper use of
language, or the uncertainty of memory, they are at best, but a doubtful species of
evidence; and at all times ought to be received with great caution.”); see infra note
167 and accompanying text.
157
See, e.g., Twining v. State of N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908) (“It was generally
regarded then, as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent
though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded, or
tyrannical prosecutions.”).
158
WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 823 (emphasis omitted); see Garrard v. State,
50 Miss. 147, 151 (1874) (“For the object of all the care which is taken to exclude
confessions which are not voluntary, is to exclude testimony not probably true.”);
Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward A Workable
Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 481 (2005)
(“The second, distinct confession doctrine that developed in England and the
Colonies in the decades leading up to the Bram decision was simply a common
law rule of evidence designed to prevent the introduction of unreliable evidence at
trial.”).
159
WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 823. The section is titled, “Other Theories not
sanctioned; Self-Crimination Privilege, distinguished.” Id. It begins: “This principle of testimonial untrustworthiness being the foundation of exclusion, it follows
that the exclusion is not rightly rested on certain other possible and occasionally
plausible theories.” Id.
160
Id. § 867. For a critique of Wigmore’s reading of the history, see George C.
Thomas III & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination
Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 255, & n.65 (1991) (“Wigmore’s analysis
is, of course, but one reading of the historical data.”).
161
WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 815.
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innocent man convicted,”162 Wigmore thought that, in his day,
“the danger of a false statement induced by an important advantage” is “of a slender character and the cases of that sort are
of the rarest occurrence.”163 Nevertheless, the doctrine remained a prominent component of the common law, so Wigmore dutifully chronicled it, warts and all.164
The common law’s treatment of confessions presents a remarkable contrast to present day evidence rules.165 A leading
English case, Rex v. Warickshall (1783), set out the common
law doctrine:
Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are or are not intitled to credit. A free and voluntary confession is deserving
of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the
strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof
of the crime to which it refers; but a confession forced from
the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear,
comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered
as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it;
and therefore it is rejected.166

An early American judicial opinion remarked that the law
jealously protected against false confessions, such that even
“telling the prisoner, what he said would be used in his favor on
his trial,” disqualified any subsequent statements.167 The case
law includes vivid examples of courts resisting the admission of
confessions that were not entirely voluntary and thus indispu162
See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); supra
Introduction.
163
WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 867. Wigmore goes on to list some of “the most
notable” examples, including this chilling example: “1660, Perry’s Case, 14 How.
St. Tr. 1312 (one of two brothers confessed that he, his brother, and his mother
had murdered his master; they were executed, but two years afterward, the
master returned home, and explained that he had been kidnapped and sold to the
Turks; it was never understood why Perry falsely confessed).” Id. § 867 n.1.
164
Id. §§ 815-867.
165
For a discussion of modern voluntariness doctrine, see Paul Marcus, It’s
Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal
Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 643 (2006) (“Many judges allow confessions
into evidence in cases in which police interrogators lied and threatened defendants or played on the mental, emotional, or physical weaknesses of suspects.”).
166
Rex v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234–35; 1 Leach 262,
263–64) (footnote omitted); see also Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 207–08 (1992) (“At the head of,
and clearly influencing, the entire line of cases stands Warickshall.”).
167
State v. Bostick, 4 Del. 563, 564 (Del. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1845) (emphasis
in original).
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tably “intitled to credit.”168 In one influential 1783 case, Jacob
Thompson came under suspicion for passing a forged check.169
When Thompson could not account for his possession of the
check to a curious official, the official stated, “unless you give
me a more satisfactory account I shall take you before a Magistrate.”170 Thompson confessed. The court excluded the confession and acquitted Thompson.171 Its opinion explained:
“This scarcely amounts to a threat, but it is certainly a strong
invitation to him to confess. . . . The prisoner was hardly a free
agent at the time.”172 The contrast is jarring. If modern American courts, like the Seventh Circuit in the Dassey case, applied
this “free agent” language in weighing the admissibility of confessions, false confessions would all but disappear from exoneration narratives.173
Paradoxically, the pinnacle of the hearsay confession doctrine in the United States came in an opinion that sowed the
seeds of its demise. In an 1897 Supreme Court case, Bram v.
United States,174 the Supreme Court unreservedly embraced
the doctrine. The Court’s opinion reads to the modern ear like
a revolutionary tract:
But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and
voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence . . . . [T]he law cannot measure the force of the
influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the
prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree
of influence has been exerted.175

Suggesting a full embrace of the common law’s “sentimentalism toward criminals,”176 Bram cites the Thompson case sum168

Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. at 234–35.
Rex v. Thompson (1783) 169 Eng. Rep. 248, 248; 1 Leach 291, 291.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 249.
172
Id.; see generally Herman, supra note 166, at 198–99 (discussing lengthy
history of Rex v. Thompson).
173
See Dassey, 877 F.3d at 304 (“[T]he Supreme Court allows police interrogators to tell a suspect that ‘a cooperative attitude’ would be to his benefit.”); see
also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979) (rejecting challenge to confession elicited from sixteen-year-old who “wept during the interrogation” and where
“police did indeed indicate that a cooperative attitude would be to respondent’s
benefit”).
174
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
175
Id. at 542–43 (quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478
(6th ed. 1896)).
176
WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 867.
169
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marized above and incorporates that case’s hyper-protective
“free agent” language.177
Most significantly, however, the Bram Court described its
analysis as “controlled by . . . the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.”178 This observation was
historically inaccurate.179 Wigmore sharply condemned
Bram’s language: “[N]o assertions could be more presumptuously unfounded. The history of the two rules . . . shows that
there never was any connection or association between the
constitutional clause and the confession-doctrine.”180 Alas,
the Supreme Court outranks even Wigmore, and its error
would prove calamitous for innocent defendants.
As Wigmore emphasized, at the time of the Bram decision
there were two prominent sources of authority regulating the
admission of confessions: (1) an evidence rule focused on reliability and (2) a constitutional rule focused on process. A useful
contrast can be drawn to modern English law which, as in the
common law tradition that it shares with the United States,
directs judges to exclude confession based on two distinct
grounds: (1) “oppression” of the accused, and (2) unreliability.181 In the United States, only the first ground survives.
The Supreme Court’s motives were likely otherwise, but by
conflating what had previously been separate doctrines, the
Court’s opinion in Bram steered American analysis of the admissibility of confessions away from reliability-based evidence
law and into process-focused Fifth Amendment doctrine. Over
177
Bram, 168 U.S. at 551–52, 564 (noting that “the statements of Bram were
not made by one who, in law, could be considered a free agent”).
178
Id. at 542–43 (“In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary,
the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(a) (4th ed.
2019) (“In the 1897 case of Bram v. United States, the Court appeared to adopt the
‘radically different approach’ of basing exclusion upon violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the Court later pulled back
from that position.”) (footnotes omitted)).
179
See Godsey, supra note 158, at 478 (critiquing Bram because the cases it
relied on “are historically unrelated to the self-incrimination clause”).
180
WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 823 n.8; cf. Herman, supra note 166, at 171
(identifying consensus that Wigmore “was historically correct”).
181
See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 76(2) (UK) (barring
admission of confession made by an accused person if the prosecutor cannot
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was not obtained: “(a) by
oppression of the person who made it; or (b) in consequence of anything said or
done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof”).
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time, Fifth Amendment doctrine became less protective, dominated by Miranda warnings182 and the notoriously permissive
constitutional voluntariness analysis applied in the Dassey
case.183 Once entangled with the constitutional inquiry, what
remained of the common law’s reliability-focused evidence rule
slowly bent toward process-focused constitutional doctrine,
and then vanished entirely. The precursors to modern evidence law, the American Law Institute’s 1942 Model Code of
Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, included
hearsay rules specific to “confessions.”184 The Federal Rules of
Evidence, by contrast, contain no reference to confessions at
all—a position that spread to the States along with the wildly
popular Federal Rules.185
As the Innocence Movement uncovers the danger of unreliable confessions, the “branch of the law of evidence”186 that
once severely restricted their admission is now a historical curiosity. Eighteenth century common law cases invoked a pure
version of voluntariness (“free agent”) that bears no resemblance to modern American conceptions.187 And, most importantly, the common law cases referenced this pure form of
voluntariness as a means of ensuring reliability, not a substitute for it.188 “Confessions [were] received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are
or are not intitled to credit.”189 Now, the sole remaining screen
182

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
See supra Introduction (discussing Dassey case); cf. Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (identifying one of “[t]he purposes of the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda” as “free[ing] courts from the task of scrutinizing individual
cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary”); Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21, at 790 (“Miranda fails to
offer any meaningful protection against the elicitation of false confessions or the
admission of false and unreliable confessions into evidence at trial.”).
184
See AM. L. INST., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 238–45 (1942) (Rule 505 “Confessions”); Uniform Rules of Evidence, in 62 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 161, 201 (1953) (Rule 63(6) “Confessions”).
185
See Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867,
872 (2018) (noting spread to states). Some vestiges remain, such as a longstanding provision in Georgia state law. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-824 (West 2020) (“To
make a confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being
induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”); cf.
Earp v. State, 55 Ga. 136, 137 (1875) (quoting statutory language).
186
State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695, 705 (1881).
187
See, e.g., Rex v. Thompson (1783) 169 Eng. Rep. 248, 249; 1 Leach 291,
293 (characterizing a defendant as “hardly a free agent” at the time their confession was coerced).
188
Id.
189
Rex v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234; 1 Leach 262, 263. Since
the focus was on reliability, not police misconduct, Warickshall emphasized that a
183

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN201.txt

338

unknown

Seq: 34

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

4-MAR-21

9:58

[Vol. 106:305

on confessions—constitutional law—explicitly rejects inquiries
into reliability. Miranda doctrine requires warnings not reliability.190 As for the constitutional voluntariness inquiry, the
Supreme Court has said: “the reliability of a confession has
nothing to do with its voluntariness.”191 After co-opting the
common law hearsay confession rule over a century ago in
Bram v. United States, the Court now declares, without any
hint of irony, that the reliability of confessions is “a matter to be
governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum.”192
3.

Confessions to Jailhouse Informants

According to Garrett’s study, 22 percent of the convictions
of DNA exonerees involved false informant testimony.193 The
questionable confession must be excluded while physical evidence that stemmed
from the confession was properly admitted. Id. at 235 (“This principle respecting
confessions has no application whatever as to the admission or rejection of facts,
whether the knowledge of them be obtained in consequence of an extorted confession, or whether it arises from any other source; for a fact, if it exist at all, must
exist invariably in the same manner, whether the confession from which it is
derived be in other respects true or false.”).
190
See GARRETT, supra note 3, at 39–40 (“[T]he Supreme Court has ruled out
reliability as a reason to exclude a confession . . . .”); Thomas & Bilder, supra note
160, at 277 (explaining that Miranda “rejected . . . the reliability of the confession
. . . as [a] test[ ] of coercion”); cf. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972)
(asserting that under Miranda, “evidence is kept from the trier of guilt or innocence for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the reliability of verdicts”).
191
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 384–85 (1964); see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1961) (“[T]he question whether Rogers’ confessions
were admissible into evidence was answered by reference to a legal standard
which took into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity. And this is
not a permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (footnote omitted)). In an earlier case, the Supreme Court referenced the “unreliability of the confession” as a possible lens through which to
reject the admission of a confession of a suspect who was “insane and incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,
207 (1960). But that reference seems overwhelmed at this point in light of the
Court’s more recent, repeated, and more direct, statements to the contrary. Dassey, 877 F.3d at 317 (discussing case law and observing that “it is not unreasonable to interpret Connelly as foreclosing” an inquiry into reliability).
192
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); cf. Leo, Neufeld, Drizin &
Taslitz, supra note 21, at 764 (“Most state courts continue to apply federal due
process criteria to evaluate the admissibility of confession evidence, yet perversely
these criteria are concerned exclusively with the so-called voluntariness, not the
reliability, of confession evidence.”).
193
Garrett, supra note 63, at 46; see also ROB WARDEN, CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND
OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 (2004) (“That makes snitches the
leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases—followed by erroneous eyewitness identification testimony in 25.2% of the cases, false confessions in
14.4%, and false or misleading scientific evidence in 9.9%.”), https://
www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP3M-U7HE].
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most notorious variants of this evidence involve witnesses who
emerge from the local jail and, in return for concessions in their
own cases, testify that they heard the defendant confess.194
The NRE reports that “eight percent of all exonerees in the
Registry were convicted in part by testimony from jailhouse
informants,” with this evidence “concentrated among the worst
crimes,” appearing in 15 percent of all murder exonerations.195
Some of the concerns about reliability raised by the confessions-to-police context also apply to confessions to jailhouse
informants. A Georgia judge writing in 1876 saw a straightforward application of the common law’s reliability-based restriction to informant-relayed confessions:
What motives may have induced this witness, who was seeking a pardon for his own criminal conduct, to extort confessions from the defendant no one can tell, and the only safe
rule in such cases is . . . to . . . reject all evidence of confessions whenever the same are induced by another, by the
slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury.196

Jailhouse informants and other cooperating witnesses who
testify about a defendant’s confession also highlight a more
modern dilemma in the law of evidence. The primary concern
in this context is not that the informant pressured the defendant to falsely confess, but that the informant fabricated the
defendant’s confession entirely.197
The typical response to concerns about live-witness perjury highlights the opponent’s ability to discredit the witness.198 When a distrusted witness relays the statements of
194
Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the Criminal System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 992–93 (2008) (“Criminal informants—i.e.,
criminal offenders who receive lenient treatment because of their cooperation with
the government—are a longstanding and important part of the criminal system.”).
195
Snitch Watch, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (May 13, 2015), http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Jailhouse-Informants.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XQN9-FKPX].
196
Stafford v. State, 55 Ga. 591, 596 (1876) (emphasis omitted) (citing GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-8-824, which codified the common law doctrine discussed in
supra section II.B.2). See also supra note 185. The statement is that of the judge
who authored the opinion in the case, but the judge then states that the majority
of the court did not agree with the sentiment. Stafford, 55 Ga. at 596–97.
197
Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 108 (2006) (“Police and prosecutors, in turn, often do not and cannot check these lies because the snitch’s
information may be all the government has. Additionally, police and prosecutors
are heavily invested in using informants to conduct investigations and to make
their cases.”); Natapoff, supra note 194, at 999 (“Informant unreliability is exacerbated by secrecy, making mistakes harder to discern and errors easier to conceal
after the fact.”)
198
See infra note 199.
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another person, the opponent can call the other person to testify and refute any falsely attributed statements. Party opponents can employ this strategy more easily than most, since
they are the other person. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
sums up the sentiment as follows: “[A] party can hardly complain of his inability to cross-examine himself. A party can put
himself on the stand and explain or contradict his former statements.”199 The drafters of California’s influential evidence
rules justify admission of party opponent hearsay statements
on the same grounds: “The rationale underlying this exception
is that the party cannot object to the lack of the right to crossexamine the declarant since the party himself made the statement. Moreover, the party . . . can explain or deny the purported admission.”200
199
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406, 420 (Pa. 1999) (quoting PA. R.
EVID. § 805); see also Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C. 1988)
(“With admissions, a usual objection to the use of hearsay—the inability to crossexamine the declarant as opposed to the witness hearing the hearsay—is not
present, since the declarant is himself a party to the litigation and therefore ‘has
the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion.’”); Globe Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 91, 95 (2004) (citing
Wigmore) (“In other words, the hearsay rule is satisfied; [the declarant] has already had an opportunity to cross-examine himself . . . or (to put it another way)
he now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and
explain his former assertion.”); State v. McClaugherty, 133 N.M. 459, 466 (2003)
(overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 275 P.3d 110, 121 n.6 (N.M.
2012)) (“An opposing party may introduce out-of-court statements made by its
opponent under the theory that the declarant party is in court and has the
opportunity to deny or explain such statements.”); State v. Richardson, 195 N.C.
App. 786, *5 (2009) (“A defendant is free to take the stand and explain, deny, or
otherwise address the statement.”); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139,
1157 (Pa. 2006) (quoting PA. R. EVID. § 805); cf. Jones v. Nat’l Am. Univ., 608 F.3d
1039, 1045 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Once the [statement] was admitted [as the statement
of a party-opponent], NAU had the opportunity to explain, rebut, or deny its
substance to reduce its evidentiary value for the jury.”); Devenyns v. Hartig, 983
P.2d 63, 69 (Colo. App. 1998) (“On the other hand, admissions or statements of a
party-opponent are not classified as hearsay because the need to admit such
statements as a part of the adversary system outweighs the concerns for trustworthiness underlying the exceptions to the hearsay rule.”); State v. Harberts, 848
P.2d 1187, 1191 n.10 (Or. 1993) (“Unlike statements by other persons, a party
can hardly object to the admissibility of his own statements, or of statements
attributable to him, on the ground that he had no opportunity to cross-examine
himself or that he is unworthy of belief. The party-opponent is considered to have
an adequate opportunity to explain or deny the contents of any such
statements.”).
200
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 2020), law revision commission’s comments.
Cf. HLC Props., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 105 P.3d 560, 565 (Cal. 2005) (“While not
binding, the Commission’s official comments reflect the intent of the Legislature
in enacting the Evidence Code and are entitled to substantial weight in construing
it.”). The even-more-influential drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence cite
California’s section 1220 in their explanation of the federal rule. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note.
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Unlike other party opponents, however, a criminal defendant’s ability to rebut incriminating statements is highly circumscribed.201 The rules surrounding defendant testimony
punish testifying and reward silence:
The Supreme Court has permitted severe burdens to be
placed on the right to testify, while prohibiting the placement
of equivalent burdens on the right to remain silent at
trial . . . . [A] properly advised defendant who wishes to testify
must consider not only the numerous legal burdens that attach should he do so, but also the many court-created benefits of remaining silent that will be foregone.202

The result of this imbalance can be seen in the large number of defendants who plead not guilty, insist on a trial, and
then decline to testify on their own behalf. “In modern times,
only about half of criminal defendants take the witness
stand.”203 Perhaps most striking is that this percentage only
changes modestly for defendants later proven innocent. John
Blume studied this phenomenon and reports that 39 percent of
factually innocent defendants did not testify.204 A comparison
of this finding to the roughly 50 percent generic non-testifying
rate for criminal trials,205 suggests that “factual guilt is a factor, but not a powerful determinant of a defendant’s decision to
testify.”206
Instead, the factors that seem to most powerfully influence
the decision whether to testify are tactical, often influenced by
evidence rules. The primary factor concerns the admissibility
of prior convictions.207 Blume reports that 91 percent of the
201
“There is less concern about trustworthiness, especially in civil cases, because the party against whom the statements are offered generally can take the
stand and explain, deny, or rebut the statements.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d
1123, 1128 (7th Cir. 2013).
202
Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal
Rules That Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 863 (2008).
203
Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 397 (2018) (citing
studies); see Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the
Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial
Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1373 tbl.2 (2009) (summarizing findings from
the broad study of felony trials).
204
John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 489
(2008). Garrett’s online database presents a similar figure (35.15 percent). See
Convicting the Innocent, Did Defendant Testify?, DUKE L.: CTR. SCI. & JUST.,
https://www.convictingtheinnocent.com/graphics/did-defendant-testify/
[https://perma.cc/46YL-S73Q] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
205
Bellin, supra note 203.
206
Id. at 430.
207
See id. (citing studies); Cassell, supra note 5, at 849 & n.208 (citing email
from Sam Gross) (citing NRE statistics regarding criminal record of wrongfully
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later-exonerated defendants who did not testify “had prior convictions that potentially could have been used for impeachment
purposes.”208 The predominant practice in American jurisdictions is that a defendant’s prior criminal convictions are not
admissible unless the defendant testifies.209 Blume again: “In
every single case in which a [later exonerated] defendant with a
prior record testified, the trial court permitted the prosecution
to impeach the defendant with his or her prior convictions.”210
Thus, it is not a satisfying answer to the ready admissibility of dubious informant-relayed confessions that the defendant can “put himself on the stand and explain or contradict
his former statements.”211 The rules of evidence penalize defendants who take the witness stand and reward those who
remain silent. The problem is not just theoretical. Empirical
evidence suggests that, for both guilty and innocent defendants, these rules “substantially damage[ ] defendants’ chances
for acquittal.”212 But only defendants who are willing to forgo
the benefits of trial silence and accept the many burdens of
testifying can directly challenge lying informants.213 And defendants who decline to take that risk suffer a “silence penalty”
that is inevitably exacerbated by jurors’ assumptions about the
reaction innocent defendants “should have” to a false accusation that they confessed.214
This takes us full circle. In trying to rationalize the common law courts’ historical reluctance to admit confessions,
Wigmore highlighted defendants’ inability to testify at common
law.
In view of the apparent unfairness of a system which practically told the accused person, “You cannot be trusted to
speak here or elsewhere in your own behalf, but we shall use
convicted, that “of those with prior-record data, 647 (42%) had a prior felony
conviction, 163 (11%) had a prior misdemeanor conviction, 30 (2%) had a prior
juvenile felony conviction, and 13 (1%) had a prior juvenile misdemeanor
conviction.”).
208
Blume, supra note 204, at 490.
209
See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 292 (2008) (“The admission of prior convictions is now a
well-established and virtually routine part of federal (and most state) criminal
proceedings in which a defendant with a criminal record takes the witness
stand.”).
210
Blume, supra note 204, at 490.
211
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406, 420 (Pa. 1999) (quoting PA. R.
EVID. § 805).
212
See Bellin, supra note 203, at 406, 417, 426.
213
Id.
214
See id. at 426.
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against you whatever you may have said,” it was entirely
natural that the judges should employ the only makeweight
which existed for mitigating this unfairness and restoring the
balance, namely, the doctrine of confessions.215

In light of the modern realities surrounding defendant testimony, an evidentiary effort aimed at “restoring the balance”
may again be needed.
C.

The Apparent Insignificance of the Most Infamous
Evidence Rules

The data on false convictions offer another important insight for evidence policymakers. Many of the most frequently
litigated and debated evidence rules do not appear to play a
direct role in convicting the innocent. If a core goal of evidence
law is preventing such convictions, this finding hints at the
need for a shift of attention.
Some of the most heated controversies in the modern evidence landscape involve evidence of uncharged crimes admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) or innovative
variants like Rules 413 and 414.216 As Ed Imwinkelried explains: “Rule 404(b) has generated more published opinions
than any other subsection of the Federal Rules. In many jurisdictions, alleged errors in the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence are the most common ground for appeal in
criminal cases.”217 The prohibition on character evidence and
215
WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 865. Illinois recently enacted a statute in this
vein. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-21(d) (West 2020) (“The court shall
conduct a hearing to determine whether the testimony of the informant is reliable,
unless the defendant waives such a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the informant’s testimony is reliable, the court
shall not allow the testimony to be heard at trial.”).
216
See Dora W. Klein, The (Mis)application of Rule 404(b) Heuristics, 72 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 706, 709 (2018) (describing Rule 404(b) as “perhaps the most controversial”); Eileen A. Scallen, Proceeding with Caution: Making and Amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 601, 610 (2008) (“The most controversial of the recent Evidence Rule changes was the addition of Rules 413-415 . . . .”).
217
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged
Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 577 (1990) (footnote omitted); see
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note to 1991 Amendment (“Rule 404(b)
has emerged as one of the most cited rules in the Rules of Evidence.”); United
States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Rule 404(b) has become the
most cited evidentiary rule on appeal.”); State v. Rutchik, 341 N.W.2d 639, 649
(Wis. 1984) (Abrahamson, J. dissenting) (“This case is another in the ever-increasing number of cases interpreting the rule excluding other crimes evidence, the
most litigated rule of evidence.”); Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 211 (2005) (offering statistics to show that “[n]o other evidentiary rule comes close to this rule as a
breeder of issues for appeals”).
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accompanying conduits for admission of prior misconduct,
however, are notably absent from the false conviction
narrative.218
Similarly, the celebrity hearsay exceptions that scholars
(and judges) love to hate generate lots of heat but do not get so
much as a cameo in the false conviction research. Academic
literature and judicial opinions spotlight the questionable reliability of evidence admitted under notoriously defendant-unfriendly hearsay exceptions, like the exception for statements
against interest,219 coconspirator statements,220 and dying
declarations.221 Judge Richard Posner recently caused a stir
when, drawing on academic critiques, he attacked the hearsay
exceptions for excited utterances and present sense impressions.222 These rules are all missing from the reports on “what
went wrong” in false convictions. The recently strengthened
(and then weakened) Confrontation Clause receives great fanfare in scholarship and judicial opinions, but seems to play
little role in false convictions.223
Perhaps the answer is that these hotly-debated evidence
rules do play a role in false convictions, but researchers overlooked the evidence rules while combing through voluminous
trial records. A key witness’ testimony could contain hearsay
and other objectionable material, but, without a trial objection,
the role of the evidence rule would be obscured. And a litigant
218
The sole exception is the narrow use of character evidence permitted by
Rule 609, which allows impeachment of a testifying defendant with prior convictions. See supra section II.B.3.
219
See, e.g., WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 104, § 6992 (“[T]he Rule 804(b)(3)
exception is one of the most controversial in the rules of evidence.”); John P.
Cronan, Do Statements Against Interest Exist? A Critique of the Reliability of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and a Proposed Reformulation, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 3 (2002) (describing psychological factors that undermine the assumptions of the rule and arguing that “research and common experience reveal myriad
reasons why persons make untrue, self-incriminating statements”).
220
See, e.g., Comment, Reconstructing the Independent Evidence Requirement
of the Coconspirator Hearsay Exception, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441–42 (1979)
(“Substantial controversy exists as to whether the coconspirator hearsay exception is actually founded upon the reliability of the evidence and whether coconspirator declarations are in fact credible.” (footnote omitted)).
221
See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to “Truth”: The Legal Mythology of Dying
Declarations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 237–43 (1998) (highlighting scientific
evidence that casts doubt on the reliability of statements of the dying).
222
See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.
concurring); Liesa L. Richter, Goldilocks and the Rule 803 Hearsay Exceptions, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 906 (2018) (“Judge Richard Posner dropped a bombshell
on traditional hearsay doctrine in a 2014 concurrence in United States v. Boyce.”).
223
See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause,
92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1866–71 (2012) (summarizing Confrontation Clause
changes and debate).
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might decline to object if the evidence is clearly admissible.
(Juries don’t like overly-objecting attorneys).224 Even with an
objection, a researcher searching for more powerful, and perhaps more obviously false, evidence, could understandably
gloss over seemingly minor evidentiary objections.225 More evidence-rules-focused research is needed. That said, it is unlikely that, across the run of cases misleading evidence of guilt
coming in through controversial evidence rules (like dying declarations or uncharged misconduct) would regularly go unnoticed by litigators, and then researchers.
A more intriguing hypothesis is that, for some of the same
reasons that they are widely litigated and debated, the more
infamous evidence rules do not admit the kind of evidence that
generates false convictions. Character evidence rules, like Rule
404 for example, may create enough of a hurdle to exclude the
most spurious propensity evidence, while only admitting damaging evidence that either correlates well with factual guilt or is
readily discounted by the factfinder.
More generally, the most notorious evidence rules may well
be admitting faulty and prejudicial evidence (in addition to valuable evidence of guilt). But the faulty evidence they admit
may be transparently unreliable. Juries may intuitively understand that when a live witness tells them what a curiously
absent witness purportedly said, that evidence must be taken
with a serving of salt.226 Similarly, if the prosecution attempts
to establish someone’s guilt of crime X by introducing evidence
of unrelated act Y, jurors may sense the disconnect—and discount accordingly.
III
IMPLICATIONS
The surprising connections between the evidence rules and
false convictions signal the need for a shift in the focus of
policymakers and scholars. The rules that appear to misfire
224
See 3 LANE GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 13:8 (3d ed. 2019) (“It is generally
accepted that jurors resent the attorney who makes an excessive number of
objections.”).
225
Garrett, supra note 100, at 96 tbl.5 (observing that state law evidence
claims were the most frequent claim raised by innocent defendants on appeal).
226
See Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 885 (2015) (reporting based on empirical studies
“that jurors spontaneously discount hearsay evidence, even when that evidence is
not subject to cross-examination”). Note that this same instinct might not apply
when the “absent” declarant is the defendant who is often sitting silently in the
courtroom and, even when testifying, is saddled with a strong transparent bias in
favor of acquittal.
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most in the quest for truth are absent from modern debates
about evidence policy. And while these rules reflect resolutions
of once-hotly-contested policy disputes, they have become so
deeply woven into the fabric of American evidence doctrine that
they are almost invisible today. False convictions research
suggests that these unnoticed rules, and not more familiar
(and more controversial) provisions, endanger innocent defendants who elect to go to trial. This novel insight points the way
to important new areas for scholarship and commentary and
potentially fertile grounds for reform.
Moving forward, the research on false convictions spotlights two broad areas where evidence policymakers should
reflect on the need for changes. The first is the ready admissibility of party opponent hearsay statements in criminal cases.
The rationale for essentially unchecked admissibility of this
form of hearsay is anomalous in that, unlike virtually every
other hearsay exception, it explicitly disclaims any connection
to reliability.227
Party opponent statements can be introduced under modern hearsay doctrine regardless of the possibility or even likelihood that those statements are unreliable. This policy choice
becomes especially problematic as DNA exonerations reveal its
substantial impact on the falsely accused, the precise group
the rules are supposed to protect.228 The only built-in reliability-protection for party opponent statements, whether offered
through a police officer or a jailhouse informant, is the ability of
the declarant-defendant to take the witness stand and explain
or refute a purported confession. Modern criminal procedure
and evidence rules, however, burden the criminal defendant’s
decision to take the witness stand with a series of unfavorable
legal and tactical consequences.229 The result is a perfect
storm of potential unreliability. Prosecutors will commonly be
able to introduce unreliable evidence of defendants’ confessions in trials where the defendant-declarant never takes the
stand to explain or refute that confession. This leaves the jury
227
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note (emphasizing that “[n]o
guarantee of trustworthiness is required”). The other example of a hearsay exception that is not based in some argument for reliability is Rule 804(b)(6), forfeiture
by wrongdoing. That rule allows the introduction of hearsay where the party
against whom the hearsay is offered wrongfully and intentionally caused the
declarant’s absence from the proceeding. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . .
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.”).
228
See supra subpart II.A.
229
See supra section II.B.3.
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in a precarious position of trying to evaluate the reliability of
these critical out-of-court statements without either of the normal tools for evaluating out-of-court statements offered for
their truth: an evidentiary rule that screens out unreliable
statements or live examination of the declarant.
Another place for evidence policymakers to look to incorporate lessons from the false convictions research is the admissibility of out-of-court statements of identification. The fallibility
of eyewitness identifications is one of the primary lessons of the
Innocence Movement.230 And just as traditional tools for ensuring reliability stumble when false confessions are introduced at trial, those tools can be ineffective in counteracting
unreliable statements of identification. As already discussed,
the rules of evidence contain no reliability screen for out-ofcourt identifications.231 The only reliability-enhancing protection is the requirement that the declarant testify. But, as the
social science literature shows, cross-examination may be particularly unhelpful in this context because the witness is typically mistaken, not lying.232 Eyewitnesses typically harbor no
recognizable bias or motive to falsely accuse the defendant.
And the mistake may be counterintuitive to jurors who understandably empathize with the victims of serious crimes and
seek to validate their claims, particularly when endorsed by the
police and prosecution, that the defendant is the
perpetrator.233
Reformers inspired by the Innocence Movement seek to
remedy the failings of both misidentifications and false confessions through increased attention to police procedures, expert
testimony, jury instructions, and criminal procedure.234 Each
of these responses suffers from weaknesses. There are
thousands upon thousands of police departments with varying
dedication to implementing improved identification and inter-

230

See supra section II.B.1.
Id.
232
See Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, supra note 138 (summarizing and explaining research); cf. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230–31 n.6 (3d Cir.
1985) (“To the extent that a mistaken witness may retain great confidence in an
inaccurate identification, cross-examination can hardly be seen as an effective
way to reveal the weaknesses in a witness’ recollection of an event.”).
233
See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230–31 n.6; Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, supra
note 138.
234
See Meghan J. Ryan & John Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of
Wrongful Conviction, 68 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1111–12 (2015) (detailing efforts and
arguing that “more can be done on this front”).
231
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rogation procedures.235 In addition, eyewitness identification
mistakes and false confessions often arise from human fallibility, and not the malevolent designs of police.236 As a result,
they cannot be eliminated even with the best investigation procedures. Expert testimony, while likely beneficial,237 is not
readily available;238 and juries can shrug off experts as overly
academic and removed from the “real world” of serious crimes
and sympathetic victims.239 Jury instructions can seem legalistic and get easily lost in the sea of other instructions.240
Criminal procedure protections based in vague constitutional
provisions like the Due Process Clause struggle to gain traction
with skeptical courts.241 Given these weaknesses, an evidence-rule-based, reliability screen for prior identifications and
hearsay confessions offers a promising alternative avenue for
reform.
Changes to the evidence rules offer numerous advantages
for reformers. The core goal of the Innocence Movement is
promoting accuracy, which parallels the primary goal of the
evidence rules.242 Hearsay exceptions, in particular, are in235
See Jon Greenberg, How Many Police Departments Are in the United
States?, POLITIFACT (July 10, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2016/jul/10/charles-ramsey/how-many-police-departments-are-us/
[https://perma.cc/C38C-QHR3] (“If you include every college campus security
department, tribal land unit, sheriff office, local police department, state police,
and every federal agency, you get to 17,985.”).
236
See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232 (2012) (emphasizing distinction between suggestive identifications created by police and those, “in which
the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement officers”).
237
See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 817, 840 (1995)
(summarizing evidence).
238
See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Constructing Evidence and Educating Juries: The
Case for Modular, Made-in-Advance Expert Evidence About Eyewitness Identifications and False Confessions, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2015) (cautioning that
expert testimony “is simply not an approach that can feasibly be used in the very
large number of cases” because “[e]xperts are simply too few in number and too
expensive to be able to be called in as many cases as they would have meaningful
relevance”).
239
Id. at 1845.
240
See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A
New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1061 (1995) (“[J]ury
instructions often work better in theory than they do in practice.”); Penrod &
Cutler, supra note 237, at 834 (“In summary, the experiments reviewed above
provide little evidence that judges’ instructions concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification improve juror decision making.”).
241
See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 243–47 (2012); supra section
II.B.1.
242
See Zalman, supra note 5, at 1335 (discussing primary goals of Innocence
Movement, including “decision accuracy”); supra part I.A (discussing goals of the
evidence rules).
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tended to foster accuracy, ensuring that, in contexts where
juries struggle to separate out-of-court truth from fiction, only
reliable evidence is introduced. And unlike constitutional
criminal procedure rules, hearsay exceptions need not target
flaws of law enforcement procedures.243 A hearsay exception
can focus unapologetically on the issue that matters most to
innocent defendants: reliability (not process). And it can be
directly tailored to the causes of false convictions. Finally, evidence rules need not purport to be dictated in their precise
parameters by vague constitutional provisions like “due process.” Typically crafted by expert committees, evidence rules
can include fine-grained requirements unapologetically tied to
interdisciplinary research and policy considerations.
The last and perhaps most important implication of this
Article’s audit of the evidence rules extends beyond any of the
specific rules of evidence discussed above. The growing body of
research on false convictions presents a blueprint for a general
reevaluation of evidence rules and doctrines. The evidence
most likely to generate false convictions seems to fit a pattern:
a victim’s earnest but mistaken selection of the defendant out
of a lineup of potential suspects; a police officer’s matter-of-fact
testimony about an out-of-court confession; an expert’s avuncular testimony that a bite-mark could not have come from
anyone other than the defendant. The common problem is not
just that this evidence is unreliable. Rather, a key ingredient of
critical evidence-rule failures appears to be a specific type of
unreliability that eludes the wisdom of lay jurors.244 This notion resonates with a prominent, but contested, vein of evidence theory that the true challenge for a system of evidence is
not unreliable evidence, but unreliable jurors.245 This sug243
See supra subpart II.B (describing Supreme Court’s restrictions on constitutional intervention to circumstances involving police misconduct).
244
See Findley, supra note 19, at 727 (suggesting that “factfinders tend to
misapprehend the risks inherent” in evidence that leads to wrongful convictions);
Leo, Neufeld, Drizin & Taslitz, supra note 21, at 774 (explaining that confessions
and their flaws “are outside the realm of common experience”). This may be a
distinction between the various types of evidence referenced in this Article. Assuming appropriate disclosures, jailhouse informant testimony (unlike other
forms of evidence discussed) may be a form of testimony that jurors intuitively
discount. See Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 510 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Brady requires
prosecutors to disclose any benefits that are given to a government informant,
including any lenient treatment for pending cases.”).
245
Cf. State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43, 56–57 (Ariz. 2001) (Martone, J. concurring) (“I do not believe that jurors need to be protected from themselves. In my
experience, jurors quite properly separate the wheat from the chaff.”); Learned
Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LECTURES ON
LEGAL TOPICS 89, 100–01 (1926) (highlighting reverential reliance on juries in most
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gests a final, overarching takeaway. Perhaps the rules of evidence could better achieve their purpose if instead of lightly
policing all evidence for reliability flaws, they aggressively
targeted the less common, but more damaging, forms of evidence that contribute to inaccurate verdicts.
CONCLUSION
A bedrock assumption of the American criminal justice
system is that trials produce accurate results.246 A “full-dress
criminal trial with its innumerable constitutional and statutory
limitations upon the evidence that the prosecution can bring
forward” is the “gold standard of American justice.”247 The
cases highlighted by the Innocence Movement tarnish that
standard. With important flaws exposed, it falls to scholars,
judges, and policymakers to examine the research on false convictions and assess what went wrong.
In conducting this assessment, it is important to recognize
that a substantial portion of the evidence that condemns innocent defendants shares a curious thread: it passes through a
typically-overlooked evidence rule that could, but does not,
protect against unreliable evidence. Presenting an unsettling
contrast, rules that do get lots of attention seem oddly unconnected to the narratives of false convictions. As conviction of
the innocent is the worst outcome for an accuracy-focused evidence regime,248 it follows that we should start paying more
attention to the neglected rules of evidence implicated in false
convictions, and less to the highly-contested rules that are not.
A shift in attention does not mean that any particular rule
must be changed. Evidence rules require a balance. Correcting too far in favor of admission or exclusion of evidence
can reduce the likelihood of accurate verdicts across the broad
run of cases. Still, in fine tuning the evidence project, it helps
to be looking in the right places. The National Transportation
Safety Board investigates the statistically rare disasters to find
contexts, as inconsistent with rules’ distrust of their ability to evaluate hearsay
evidence); Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and
the “Search for Truth” in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1996)
(highlighting tension between “exalting” the jury and the “elaborate rules . . .
devised to keep relevant evidence from the jury on the ground that it might be too
prejudicial”).
246
See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)
(“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.”).
247
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 186 (2012) (Scalia, J. dissenting); cf.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (similar language).
248
See supra subpart I.A.
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out what went wrong, rather than the vast majority of uneventful flights.249 Evidence policymakers too should examine false
conviction data for failures of the evidence rules. Evidence
rules—which focus directly on fostering the accuracy of verdicts—are a logical, but so far overlooked next stop for the
Innocence Movement.

249
See Adam M. Gershowitz, An NTSB for Capital Punishment, 47 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 151, 160 (2014) (describing NTSB’s responsibilities).

